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W ARRANTLESS SEARCHES of automobiles and
other vehicles comprise one of the most controversial
and confusing areas of constitutional law.' The Supreme
Court has constructed an intricate web of fourth amend-
ment rules2 and exceptions 3 governing the authority of
I Justice Rehnquist once termed the laws governing warrantless searches and
seizures, especially those involving vehicles, as "something less than a seamless
web." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). A majority of the
Supreme Court in 1982 referred to vehicle searches as "this troubled area."
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817 (1982). Justice O'Connor has referred to
"[tihe hair-splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984) (O'ConnorJ, con-
curring in part). Justice Powell stated that the "law of search and seizure with
respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing." Powell further stated that "[t]he
Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone on
how these cases should be decided." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430
(1981) (Powell,J., concurring), overruled, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-
25 (1982) (a plurality of the Court in Robbins required officers to obtain a search
warrant before searching containers inside an automobile; one year later in Ross
the Court rejected Robbins, holding that if an officer has probable cause to search a
lawfully stopped vehicle, he may search every part of the vehicle, including con-
tainers, in which the object of the search might reasonably be found); see also Note,
Warrantless Vehicle Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court Attacks the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1982) (discussing Burger Court decisions
on warrantless searches).
2 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see infra notes 29-55 and accompanying text for discussion
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law enforcement officers to search automobiles without a
warrant. The Court has also ruled on warrantless
searches of motor homes4 and boats, 5 but has never di-
rectly addressed aircraft searches.6 A majority of the
United States Courts of Appeals, however, has addressed
searches of private aircraft. These courts have reached a
number of different results by using a variety of ratio-
nales.7 The vast majority of these cases involve airplanes
engaged in drug smuggling.8
Illicit narcotics are estimated to be the United States'
second largest industry, with total revenues that may
reach as much as $300 billion per year.9 While drug traf-
fickers occasionally smuggle narcotics on commercial air-
of fourth amendment rules. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE §§ 3.1-4.6 (1984 & Supp. 1989) (Volume 1 of the treatise contains a com-
prehensive overview of the fourth amendment).
See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for a summary of exceptions to
the warrant requirement; see also 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, §§ 3.1-4.6
for further discussion of the fourth amendment.
4 See infra notes 145-148 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts
have applied the fourth amendment to motor home searches.
See infra notes 149-157 and accompanying text for discussion of applications
of the fourth amendment to boats.
,i See infra note 158 for aircraft search cases in which the Supreme Court has
denied certiorari.
I See infra note 159-163 for a summary of the circuit courts' applications of the
automobile exception to private airplane searches; infra notes 250-283 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of searches incident to arrest; infra notes 284-316
and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain view doctrine; infra notes 317-
333 and accompanying text for a discussion of limited intrusion searches; infra
notes 334-340 and accompanying text for a discussion of administrative inventory
searches; infra notes 341-343 and accompanying text for a discussion of the open
fields doctrine; infra notes 344-348 and accompanying text for a discussion of con-
sent searches; and infra notes 349-358 and accompanying text for a discussion of
border searches.
8 All airplane searches discussed in this Comment involve drug smuggling, with
the exception of Patterson v. National Transportation Safety Board, 638 F.2d 144
(10th Cir. 1980) (open fields doctrine used to justify a warrantless search by a
Federal Aviation Administration safety inspector who uncovered illegal modifica-
tions to an aircraft). See infra notes 341-343 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Patterson. This Comment focuses on private aircraft searches. It does not
address commercial aircraft searches, or searches of passengers or baggage
aboard commercial aircraft, which are performed primarily for security and safety
purposes.
11 ligner & Reeder, Programme Update: Use of Aerostat Radars for Illicit-Drug Interdic-
tion Continues to Widen, ICAO BULL., June 1988, at 18.
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lines, more than eighty percent of illicit narcotics air
transport occurs by way of noncommercial, or general,
aviation.' 0 The southern border of the United States pro-
vides a prime example of the tremendous volume of ille-
gal narcotics smuggling. Federal agencies seized 18,487
pounds of marijuana and 7,029 pounds of cocaine from
private aircraft along this border in 1988." The federal
government's increased interest in controlling drug traf-
fic, combined with advances in electronic surveillance and
radar tracking technology, should result in an increased
number of private aircraft being apprehended and
searched. 12
Aircraft searches raise a variety of issues. One issue
concerns determining whether a party has standing to
raise a claim that officials violated his fourth amendment
rights during a warrantless search. Owners, lessors, les-
sees, pilots, and passengers all have different interests
- United Nations and its Agencies Heighten War Against Illicit Drugs, ICAO BULL.,
Feb. 1987, at 9, 10. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Secre-
tariat presented this information at the United Nations' First International Con-
ference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, which was held in Vienna, Austria
on June 17-26, 1987. Id. at 9. The Secretariat also noted that drug smugglers
frequently fly at low altitudes in an unsafe manner, fail to file flight plans, and
often steal airplanes or rent them under false pretenses, all in violation of the
Chicago Convention and its Annexes. Id. at 10; see Convention on International
Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 (commonly known as the Chicago Convention).
I High-Flying Deterrent, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 15, 1989, at 43A, col. 2.
2 See, e.g., Early Warning Aircraft Procured for Drug Interdiction, ICAO BULL., Aug.
1988, at 20 (data provided by Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co., U.S.A.).
United States customs officials began using radar-equipped Lockheed P-3 Orion
aircraft, which have a 508,000 square kilometer detection range, in mid-1988 to
aid in detecting both airborne and ground-level drug smugglers. Id.; see also
Ilgner & Reeder, supra note 9, at 19. An aerostat radar system, consisting of a
helium-filled balloon equipped with radar capable of tracking drug smugglers
over a 240 kilometer range, is being used along the southern border of the United
States and above the Caribbean Sea to detect low-flying aircraft. Id. at 19-20; see
also Dallas Morning News, supra note 11, at 43A, col. 2. In 1988 the amount of
marijuana seized by federal agencies from private aircraft along the northern bor-
der of Mexico represented a 51% increase over 1987 seizures. The amount of
cocaine seized increased by 91% over the same period. Id.; see also Kroll, Can the
Fourth Amendment Go High Tech?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1987, at 70 (Kroll gives a brief
history of leading fourth amendment cases involving technology and
surveillance).
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with respect to the ownership and operation of an air-
plane, and therefore, have different expectations of pri-
vacy. 13 Another issue focuses on whether the exceptions
to the warrant requirement that are designed for
automobiles should also apply to airplanes. 14 The two
most common rationales for the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement, mobility and decreased expecta-
tions of privacy, do not necessarily apply to airplanes in
the same manner as they apply to automobiles. 15 A third
issue concerns whether the scope permitted for automo-
bile searches applies to airplanes. 16 A fourth issue is
whether the same rules regarding the search of compart-
ments and containers inside automobiles also apply to
compartments and containers inside aircraft. 7 Finally,
the circuits do not agree on whether an officer may climb
onto the wings of an airplane and peer inside for the pur-
poses of the plain view doctrine.'
This Comment will: (1) briefly describe fourth amend-
ment principles and exceptions, including standing, prob-
able cause, and reasonable expectations of privacy, (2)
analyze the decisions of the different circuits regarding
private aircraft searches, and (3) discuss possible solu-
tions to the problems encountered in applying the
Supreme Court's bright line rules.
I. See infra notes 65-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interests
of these parties and their ability to establish standing to challenge a search.
14 See infra notes 158-168 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether an
airplane is the functional equivalent of an automobile.
1-1 See infra notes 133-249 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ratio-
nales of mobility and decreased expectations of privacy with regard to
automobiles.
61 See infra notes 250-283 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope
of automobile and airplane searches that are incident to arrest.
1" See infra notes 141 and 254-255 and accompanying text for a discussion of
searches of containers that are inside a vehicle.
1" See infra notes 284-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain
view doctrine.
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II. BACKGROUND: FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Historical
The fourth amendment provides for protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures by government offi-
cials.' 9 While the framers of the Constitution were con-
cerned primarily with protection against searches
conducted pursuant to general warrants or no warrant at
all,20 modern technology has added new concerns and
dimensions to the protection of fourth amendment
rights.2 ' Electronic eavesdropping devices, high-magnifi-
cation telescopic and infrared lenses, and other high tech
equipment allow government officials to see, hear, and
search in a manner well beyond the imaginations of those
who drafted the Constitution.22
Early cases involving searches conducted without war-
rants focused on the protection of property rights. The
19 See supra note 2 for the text of the fourth amendment. For further discussion
of the fourth amendment and warrantless searches, see generally 1 W. LAFAVE &J.
ISRAEL, supra note 2, §§ 3.1-3.10.
20 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 583-84 (1980); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886); see
alsoJ. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CON-
STITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-48 (1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 53-78,
101-03 (1937); R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 11
(1955); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (electronic track-
ing "beeper" placed in a container inside an automobile does not violate a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979)
(telephone company's use of pen registers to record telephone numbers dialed
from a particular telephone does not violate the fourth amendment); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747, 754 (1971) (use of radio transmission equip-
ment attached to a "wired" informant does not invade a reasonable expectation of
privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (use of electronic devices
to enhance eavesdropping does not violate fourth amendment rights); see also
Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461,
1496 n.150 (1977) (airplanes are regularly tracked by the government on radar
and therefore are frequently subjected to "regulatory" searches, which suggests a
lower expectation of privacy inside an aircraft). For a discussion of administrative
and regulatory searches, see infra notes 334-340 and accompanying text, and infra
notes 33-55 and accompanying text, for a discussion of reasonable expectations of
privacy.
22 See, e.g., Kroll, supra note 12 (discussing technological advances in
surveillance).
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courts usually required a trespass on private property
before recognizing a fourth amendment violation.23 In a
1967 electronic surveillance case, Katz v. United States,24
the Supreme Court departed from its property rights ap-
proach and held that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places."' 25 The Court held that the important
issue was not whether law enforcement officials trespassed
on private property while conducting their search, but
whether they invaded a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.26 Thus, the Court's current view may allow tres-
passes on private property in some instances, 27 but may
also disallow searches conducted in public places if the
search violates a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy.28
B. Fourth Amendment Requirements
The fourth amendment requires that searches and
23 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
457, 464, 466 (1928).
24 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2-. Id. at 351. The Court repeated this phrase in many subsequent fourth
amendment decisions including Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7, 9 (1977); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 8 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 193 (1969); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
V1 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
2 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-84 (1984) (the fourth
amendment does not protect the open fields beyond the area immediately sur-
rounding a private dwelling, which is called the curtilage; government officials
may trespass on open fields without invading a reasonable expectation of privacy);
see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (four factors determine
the curtilage: (1) proximity to the dwelling, (2) whether the area is enclosed, (3)
use of the area, and (4) steps taken to protect the area); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-14
(1986) (both cases holding that aerial observations are not considered to be
searches under the open fields doctrine). The Court further expanded the scope
of the open fields dectrine in 1989. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97 (1989)
(an officer's observations from a helicopter hovering within navigable airspace do
not constitute a search for which a warrant is required). For a discussion of the
open fields doctrine, see infra notes 341-343 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1980) (a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to items that are sent through the
mail and mistakenly opened).
seizures not be unreasonable and that warrants not be is-
sued unless probable cause to search or seize exists. 29 De-
termining what is "reasonable" and what constitutes
"probable cause" is left to the courts. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of these terms, however, has
changed frequently. The Court employs, but has not
expressly announced, a three-step analysis to determine
whether fourth amendment requirements have been met.
The steps are (1) determining whether a person has
standing to raise a claim; (2) determining whether a
search or seizure actually occurred; and (3) determining
whether the search or seizure was reasonable.
The first step in analyzing a fourth amendment claim is
to determine whether a person has standing to contend
that his fourth amendment rights were violated. The
threshold issue is whether the person had a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the area searched or
the item seized.3 If no reasonable expectation of privacy
existed, then a claim that fourth amendment rights have
been violated may not be raised. 2
The second step in determining whether a person's
fourth amendment rights have been violated is to deter-
mine whether a search or seizure occurred. A search is
defined as an intrusion by the government upon a per-
son's reasonable expectation of privacy. A seizure is the
exercise of control by the government over a person or
29 See supra note 2 for the text of the fourth amendment.
50 See generally Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 227 (1984); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment With the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw.
L.J. 573 (1971).
-11 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
32 Id.; see infra notes 65-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the re-
quirement of standing.
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (defining a search as
occurring "when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed"); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (a
person's expectation of privacy must be "legitimate"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 (1978) (fourth amendment rights are personal; therefore a person's own
reasonable expectation of privacy must be violated); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (a search must be made by a government official as opposed
to a private citizen for there to be a violation of fourth amendment rights).
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thing.3 4 Searches and seizures conducted by private indi-
viduals are not protected by the fourth amendment; the
search must be conducted by a government official. 5 In
addition, any expectation of privacy invaded by a govern-
ment official must be objectively reasonable for the
amendment to apply.3 6 If a person's property interest in
an item is not sufficient to challenge a search or seizure,37
or if the item is essentially public in nature, 8 then that
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy to be
31 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 120-21 (1984) (defining a
seizure as a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in
... property"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (defining a seizure as a "gov-
ernmental invasion of a citizen's personal security"); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
76 (1906) (holding that "a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the
owner"), overruled on other grounds, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964) (overruling Hale's holding regarding the fifth amendment).
3 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). But see People v. Fierro, 236
Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 (1965) (if a law enforcement officer en-
courages a private citizen to conduct an illegal search, the search violates the de-
fendant's fourth amendment rights).
3, See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
47 Id. at 132-34; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (mere
ownership of an item does not necessarily give rise to standing to challenge the
item's seizure); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-87, 95 (1980) (abolish-
ing the "automatic standing" rule, which provided that a person charged with a
crime relating to the possession of an item automatically had standing to chal-
lenge the seizure of that item). For a discussion of standing, see infra notes 65-98
and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (what can be seen
from an airplane is of a public nature); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46
(1979) ("pen registers" used by telephone company to record telephone numbers
dialed from a particular telephone); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974)
(paint samples scraped from an automobile); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1, 14 (1973) (the sound of a person's voice); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19,
22 (1973) (a person's handwriting); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 124-25 (1984) (cocaine field testing, which consists of taking small samples of
substances believed to be cocaine and testing them to determine their composi-
tion, does not violate reasonable expectations of privacy); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (a limited intrusion that merely reveals the existence
of contraband, such as a narcotics "sniff test" of luggage by trained dogs, does not
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy). Items that are of a public nature are
not protected by the fourth amendment. However, a reasonable expectation of
privacy may accompany some items held out to the public, in certain circum-
stances. For example, a merchant has a reasonable expectation of privacy regard-
ing books and films on display for sale if their covers do not indicate they are
pornographic. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979). For fur-
ther discussion of reasonable expectations of privacy regarding airplanes, see infra
notes 167-168.
protected. Government officials may search for and seize
the instrumentalities of a crime, the fruits of a crime, con-
traband, and the "mere evidence" of a crime. 9
The third step is to determine whether the search or
seizure was reasonable under the fourth amendment.
The primary concern is whether officers properly ob-
tained a warrant, and if not, whether the search or seizure
fell under an established exception to the warrant require-
ment. Unless a search can be justified under an estab-
lished exception, a law enforcement officer must obtain a
search warrant.40 To obtain a warrant, an officer must
demonstrate that he has probable cause to conduct a
search, which is accomplished by presenting to a neutral
magistrate sufficient facts and circumstances such that a
reasonable person would conclude that seizable evidence
will be found on the premises to be searched. 4 A "total-
ity of the circumstances" test is used to examine tips sup-
plied by informants; these tips may be used to aid in
establishing probable cause, so long as the informant is
reliable and has a sound basis for his information.42 If the
informant has not given previous tips or chooses to re-
main anonymous, information that the officers corrobo-
rate may be used to establish probable cause.4 3
When he determines that the officers have established
probable cause, the magistrate may issue the search war-
rant. The warrant must specify with reasonable certainty
the place to be searched and the items to be seized.44 A
doctrine known as the exclusionary rule may prohibit evi-
dence obtained by an illegal search or seizure from being
-"' Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967).
.10 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965); see infra notes 56-63
and accompanying text for a summary of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
41 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56, 162 (1925).
4 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
41 Id. at 237-38.
4 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82, 484 (1976). The court held
that a search warrant which listed and described certain items, but also authorized
the seizure of "other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of the crime at this
[time] unknown" was sufficiently precise. Id. at 479 (brackets in original).
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used against a suspect in criminal proceedings. 45 There-
fore, if officers do not properly obtain a search warrant,
their search must meet the conditions of one of the recog-
nized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Otherwise,
under most circumstances, the evidence obtained during
the search will not be admissible in criminal
proceedings .46
Fourth amendment protections apply to any area in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
including his home,4 7  office,48  automobile,49  motor
45 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that illegally ob-
tained evidence may not be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding); see
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to
cases heard in state courts). All evidence obtained illegally must be excluded,
including evidence acquired indirectly as a result of an illegal search. Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) ("fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine). But see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984) (adoption of the inevi-
table discovery rule, which allows the use of evidence that ultimately would have
been discovered even without the existence of police misconduct); Wong Sun, 371
U.S. at 486, 491 (the intervening voluntary act of a defendant dissipates the taint
of an official's illegal act, such as an illegal search) (quoting Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (stating the independent source rule, which provides that knowl-
edge gained from an independent source may be used against a suspect). For
further discussion, see Wingo, supra note 30, at 575, which questions whether the
exclusionary rule actually deters illegal arrests, searches, and seizures, and
whether the Supreme Court is correct in holding that there are no other more
effective ways to enforce the fourth amendment.
- See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). If, for example, officers
unknowingly obtain a defective warrant and rely on the warrant in good faith,
evidence obtained from the illegal search can be introduced in criminal proceed-
ings under the Leon "good faith exception." Id. at 926; see infra notes 56-63 and
accompanying text for a summary of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
47 See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968). A person's
expectations of privacy are highest inside his home. To search a residence with-
out a warrant, at least one of the following circumstances must exist: (1) the officer
must have the consent of a person authorized to give such consent and must
search only the area in which that person gives consent to search; (2) if the officer
makes an arrest in the home, he may search only the area within the control of the
person being arrested; or (3) the officer must believe that exigent circumstances
exist, such as the possible destruction of evidence, the need to prevent harm to
others, or actually be in hot pursuit of a suspect. Id.; see also United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (authority to give consent); Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970) (the arrest must occur inside the house to justify a warrant-
less search incident to arrest); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)*(of-
icers may search the area within the reach of the arrestee at the time of the
arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (search and seizure was
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home, 50 and boat,5' as well as his own body.52  Most
courts hold that airplanes are analogous to automobiles, 53
while others distinguish the two vehicles.54 Whether or
not an airplane is analogous to an automobile, boat, or
mobile home, fourth amendment principles and excep-
tions apply to any reasonable expectations of privacy a
person may have regarding the airplane.55
C. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court recognizes at least eight exceptions
justified by exigent circumstances created by the pursuit of a robbery suspect).
For a discussion of consent searches, see infra notes 344-348 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of searches incident to arrest, see infra notes 250-283 and
accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search of a university
newspaper office, pursuant to a search warrant); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463 (1976) (search of a law office, pursuant to a search warrant).
4t) Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (an automobile's mobility
was used to justify the creation of an exception to the warrant requirement); see
also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-22 (1982) (containers in an automo-
bile may be searched); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (per curiam)
(an officer's observations during a legal traffic stop may give rise to probable
cause to search a vehicle); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (uphold-
ing the search of an automobile towed to a station house if the police had prob-
able cause to search at the time the automobile was stopped). For discussion of
the automobile exception, see infra notes 133-249 and accompanying text.
m" See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 388, 392-94 (1985) (holding that the
automobile exception applies to motor homes parked in public parking lots). For
a discussion of Carney, see infra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
-' See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (authoriz-
ing the warrantless search of a sailboat that was on inland waters but had ready
access to the open sea); see also Note, Supreme Court Misses the Boat in Approving
Warrantless Random Vessel Seizures: United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 18 U.S.F. L.
REV. 617 (1984). For a discussion of Villamonte-Marquez, see infra notes 149-157
and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (allowing the search
of a person and the area within his immediate reach when he is arrested); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (allowing a limited "stop and frisk" of a person's
outer clothing based upon an officer's reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot). For discussion of searches incident to arrest, see infra notes 250-283.
For a discussion of limited detentions, see infra notes 317-333.
-. See infra notes 158-249 and accompanying text for a discussion of holdings
that analogize airplanes to automobiles.
.4 See infra notes 226-231 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fifth
Circuit's reluctance to hold that airplanes are analogous to automobiles.
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see supra notes 31-55 and
accompanying text for a discussion of reasonable expectations of privacy.
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to the warrant requirement. The exceptions include (1)
automobile exception searches,56 (2) searches incident to
lawful arrest,5 7 (3) plain view doctrine,5 8 (4) open fields
doctrine,5" (5) limited intrusion searches,60 (6) administra-
tive inventory searches, 6' (7) consent searches, 62 and (8)
border searches.63 The United States Courts of Appeals
m Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (permitting warrantless
open road searches); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-22 (1982)
(allowing the search of containers inside an automobile); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (upholding the search of an automobile at a police station).
For a discussion of applying the automobile exception to airplanes, see infra notes
158-249 and accompanying text.
'7 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (upholding the search of a
jacket that was inside an automobile at the time of arrest); United States v. Ed-
wards, 415 U.S. 800, 807-09 (1974) (allowing the search of an arrestee at a police
station after arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (uphold-
ing the search of a person at the time of his arrest); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969) (allowing the search of the premises incident to arrest); see infra
notes 258-283 and accompanying text for a discussion of airplane searches inci-
dent to arrest.
.1 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971); see infra notes 284-
316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain view doctrine and aircraft
searches.
-5, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-84 (1984); see infra notes 341-343
and accompanying text for a discussion of the open fields doctrine.
11 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (a limited detention and search for
weapons, commonly known as a stop and frisk, is not an unreasonable search and
seizure under the fourth amendment if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity may be afoot); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 688
(1985) (twenty-minute detention was not unreasonable and did not amount to a
full custodial arrest); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (a frisk is
limited to the outer clothing, but an officer may reach into the clothing if he has
information that a weapon is hidden inside the clothing). For an application of
limited intrusion searches to aircraft, see infra notes 317-333 and accompanying
text.
o Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (permitting administrative in-
ventory searches of personal possessions upon arrest); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364, 373, 376 (1976) (upholding routine inventory searches of
automobiles towed to the police station); see infra notes 334-340 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of inventory searches of airplanes.
62 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (a person who shares an
apartment may give consent to search common areas, but not areas over which he
has no control); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (consent
must be given freely and voluntarily); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
548-50 (1968) (if police falsely claim to have a warrant, consent is presumed to be
given involuntarily); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1964) (a hotel
clerk may not give consent to search the room of a hotel guest); see infra notes 344-
348 and accompanying text for a discussion of consent searches.
' Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-75 (1973) (a search at
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have applied all of these exceptions to airplane searches,
but have not always agreed upon how they should be ap-
plied. Section IV of this Comment discusses how the
courts have applied the exceptions to airplane searches.64
III. STANDING: WHO MAY RAISE FOURTH
AMENDMENT CLAIMS?
Before a person may raise a claim that his fourth
amendment rights have been violated, he must demon-
strate that he has standing to challenge the alleged viola-
tions. 65 To meet the standing requirement, a person must
show that, at the time of the search, he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in either the area searched or the
item seized.66 The mere fact that evidence obtained from
a search or seizure is introduced against a suspect does
not give him "automatic standing" to raise a fourth
amendment challenge. 67
While ownership of property that was searched or
seized is an important factor, it is not determinative of
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.68 Instead, the Supreme Court has adopted a "total-
an international border may be conducted without a warrant or probable cause);
see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (officers may
stop any person or vehicle at a permanent checkpoint for brief questioning with-
out either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but must have probable cause
to conduct a search); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975) (officer
must have probable cause to search an automobile at a permanent checkpoint);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (a roving patrol may
stop and question the occupants of an automobile if reasonable suspicion exists,
but must have probable cause to search). For a discussion of border searches, see
infra notes 349-358 and accompanying text. For a discussion of reasonable suspi-
cion and probable cause, see infra notes 121-132 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 99-358 and accompanying text for a discussion of exceptions
to the warrant requirement as applied to airplanes.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
6 Id. at 142; see supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of
reasonable expectations of privacy.
67 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-87, 95 (1980) (abolishing the "au-
tomatic standing" rule, which stated that a defendant charged with a possessory
offense had automatic standing to challenge the legality of both the search and
seizure of evidence introduced against him).
- Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
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ity of the circumstances" test, in which it weighs a variety
of factors including the ownership, possession, and loca-
tion of the property searched or seized. 69 The Court also
considers the extent of the intrusion upon a person dur-
ing the search. For example, the Court has held that a
limited intrusion which merely reveals the possession of a
controlled substance, such as a "sniff test" by trained nar-
cotics detection dogs, does not invade a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.70 In addition to these objective
factors, the Court may also consider subjective factors,
such as whether the person objecting to the search or
seizure actually believed that the area searched would be
free from governmental intrusion. 7' Another factor is
whether the officer was "legitimately on the premises" at
the time of the search. This factor was once dispositive,
but is now only one of many factors considered.72
Although a person claiming that an illegal search of an
aircraft or an illegal seizure of evidence aboard the air-
craft violated his fourth amendment rights must first es-
tablish that he has standing, the courts do not always
strictly enforce this requirement. For example, in United
States v. Nigro73 the Sixth Circuit held that, despite the
government's claim that a passenger who had purchased
fuel for the airplane lacked standing to object to the
"1 Id. In Rawlings, the defendant placed narcotics in an acquaintance's purse.
While the defendant was present, police officers requested that the acquaintance
empty her purse. When she complied, the defendant's narcotics fell out. Because
the defendant had known the acquaintance only a few days and had not previously
had access to the purse, the court held that his ownership of the narcotics was not
sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
search of the purse. Id. at 101-02 n.l.
" United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) ("sniff tests" by trained
dogs do not violate any reasonable expectations of privacy); see also United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1984) (taking samples of substances believed
to be cocaine and testing them to determine their compositions, which is known
as cocaine field testing, does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy).
7' Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105 (Rawlings admitted that he did not believe the
purse would be free from governmental intrusion).
72 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148. The Court held that passengers in an automobile had
no standing to contest its search simply because they were "legitimately on the
premises." Id.
7- 727 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1984).
search of the airplane, the passenger had established
standing "under all the facts and circumstances. 7 4 The
court, however, pointed to no specific facts or circum-
stances in support of its conclusion. In one sentence the
court simply held that standing was established, but gave
no rationale or explanation for its conclusion. 5
An example of a district court's failure to require the
defendant to establish standing to challenge a search oc-
curred in United States v. Bachner.76 The Eleventh Circuit
remanded the case to the district court because the lower
court adopted a magistrate's recommendation to suppress
evidence, even though the defendant never demonstrated
any reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the
airplane." The magistrate refused to address whether the
airplane's pilot had standing, despite the government's at-
tempt to raise the issue. 78 The only evidence on the rec-
ord supporting a reasonable expectation of privacy was
the defendant's presence during the search. 79 The magis-
trate stated that standing was "not necessarily a threshold
question" and that the issue did not need to be addressed
in that particular case.8 0
These cases are the exception rather than the rule, but
74 Id. at 103.
I7 d. The court's entire discussion of standing consists of the following sen-
tence: "Though the government maintained that Nigro lacked standing to object
to the search of the plane, we conclude that under all the facts and circumstances,
including the stipulation for use of the Corp hearing as a basis for deciding
Nigro's motion, standing was established." Id. The contents of the Corp hearing
are not described in the opinion. The court refers to Nigro's companion case,
United States v. Corp, 452 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. Tenn. 1977). In Corp, the court did
not discuss standing because the government did not raise the issue. Corp, 452 F.
Supp. at 190.
7,; 706 F.2d 1121 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983).
77 Id. at 1125.
71 Id. at 1127.
75 Id. at 1126.
81 Id. at 1127. In denying the government's request to address the standing
issue, the magistrate stated that '"standing' is 'not necessarily a threshold ques-
tion' and that this case 'does not appear to be one of those instances where the
threshold question exists.' " Id. The magistrate reserved ruling on the standing
issue, proceeded to consider whether the search and seizure were unreasonable,
and never made a final ruling in regard to standing. Id.
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they serve to illustrate that the courts are not always con-
sistent in either requiring or analyzing standing. Most
courts, however, require that the defendant show some
type of interest in either the aircraft itself or the items
seized to establish standing to challenge a search or
seizure. If the defendant contests the legality of the
search or seizure, he has the burden of proving that he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the
airplane. 8 As with any other type of property, even
though ownership is an important factor to consider,
mere proof of ownership of an airplane is not sufficient to
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.82
Two other important factors in establishing standing
are (1) possession and (2) dominion and control. These
factors alone, however, are not sufficient if the defendant
cannot also demonstrate some type of property interest in
the airplane or that he used the airplane with the owner's
permission. For example, in United States v. Dickerson,83 a
pilot accused of smuggling drugs argued that his domin-
ion and control over the aircraft should be sufficient to
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. 4 The cer-
tificate of ownership indicated that Fantail, Inc. owned the
aircraft. Dickerson presented no evidence indicating that
he possessed any interest in the corporation or that he
flew with the owner's permission. The court, therefore,
held that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
The court also stated that anyone piloting a stolen air-
plane will have difficulty establishing standing to contest a
search of the plane or a seizure of its contents.8 5 Because
many airplanes used in smuggling operations are either
stolen or have falsified Federal Aviation Administration
11 United States v. Dickerson, 655 F.2d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1981). The govern-
ment must raise the issue of standing at the trial court level in order to raise it on
appeal. United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1985).
82 United States v. Martinez, 625 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Del. 1985) (citing Rawl-
ings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) and United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980)).
- 655 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1981).
s4 Id. at 561.
85 Id.
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(FAA) registration and ownership records,8 6 drug-smug-
gling pilots may have difficulty establishing standing and,
therefore, be unable to raise fourth amendment claims at
all.
Even if a person demonstrates a property interest in an
aircraft, he may not be able to establish standing if he re-
linquished its possession and control to another party. In
United States v. Dyar s7 and United States v. Tussell,88 the re-
spective courts held that a person who finances the leas-
ing of an airplane does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy if he subsequently turns possession and control
over to a pilot. Both courts emphasized that the defend-
ants, who had financed the leasing, were not present at
the time of the search. Therefore, they relinquished their
reasonable expectations of privacy when they gave posses-
sion and control of the respective airplanes to the pilots.89
If, however, the financing party retains some control,
such as the authority to determine who has access to the
aircraft, then the court may find that he has retained a suf-
ficient expectation of privacy to challenge the search. For
example, in United States v. Burnett,90 the lessee of a van
gave written permission to another person to use the van,
but retained the ultimate authority regarding access to the
vehicle.9 ' The court found that, based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, both the lessee and the driver
had standing.92
Passengers present a different set of issues with regard
to standing. A mere passenger in an airplane has no rea-
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ICAO's con-
cerns about private aircraft used in drug smuggling, including the facts that many
airplanes used are stolen and FAA records falsified.
97 574 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978).
8 441 F. Supp. 1092 (M.D. Penn. 1977).
s: Dyar, 574 F.2d at 1390-91; Tussell, 441 F. Supp. at 1103.
90 493 F. Supp. 948 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
m Id. at 952.
1"2 Id.; see also United States v. Cresta, 592 F. Supp. 889, 905 (D. Me. 1984)
(holding that the lessee of an automobile who allows others to drive the vehicle
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the automobile strictly
on the basis of his possessory interest).
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sonable expectation of privacy with regard to the airplane
itself, but may retain a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding any personal belongings he brings aboard.93
While passengers may not raise fourth amendment issues
regarding a search of the airplane itself, they may chal-
lenge searches of their luggage, cargo, and any other
items for which they have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.94
The holdings in Dickerson, Dyar, Tussell, and Burnett indi-
cate that to establish standing, one who holds a property
interest in an airplane must either be in possession of the
airplane at the time of a search or must retain some de-
gree of dominion and control over the aircraft.9 5 A pilot
must not only be in possession of the airplane, but must
also establish either a property interest in the airplane or
that he is flying with the permission of someone who
holds a property interest.96 A mere passenger with no
property interest has no standing to challenge the search
of the aircraft. 97 A passenger, however, does have stand-
ing to challenge the seizure of any item in which he has a
1,-1 United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that mere
passengers on airplanes, who make no claim of ownership, have no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to a search of the airplane); see also United
States v. Martinez, 625 F. Supp. 384, 389-90 (D. Del. 1985) (persons unloading
drugs from an airplane have no reasonable expectation of privacy and may not
object to a search of the airplane). See generally United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (a person's expectations of privacy regarding searches of per-
sonal luggage are greater than his expectations of privacy regarding searches of
an automobile).
94 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 142 n.l I (1978) (indicating that a visitor in a house would have standing
to challenge a search or seizure of his own property). But cf Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that a person who put narcotics in an acquain-
tance's purse did not have standing to challenge the search of the acquaintance's
purse). For further discussion of Rakas and Rawlings, see supra notes 65-72 and
accompanying text.
. See United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d 1385, 1390-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 982 (1978); United States v. Tussell, 441 F. Supp. 1092, 1103 (M.D. Penn.
1977).
- See United States v. Burnett, 493 F. Supp. 948, 952 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
9,7 United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 1979); see also United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1977); United States v. Martinez, 625 F.
Supp. 384, 389-90 (D. Del. 1985). For further discussion of these cases, see supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
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property interest, if he can show that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the item while it was
aboard the aircraft. 98
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. Overview of the Difficulty in Applying Established
Exceptions to Aircraft Searches
Once a defendant establishes standing to challenge a
warrantless search, the burden shifts to the prosecution to
prove that the search was justified under one of the recog-
nized exceptions to the warrant requirement.99 While the
United States Courts of Appeals have applied all eight es-
tablished exceptions to aircraft searches,100 the most com-
monly applied are the automobile exception,' 10 searches
incident to arrest, 0 2 and the plain view doctrine.10 3
These three exceptions are the most relevant to vehicle
searches; they are also the most controversial.10 4
The United States Courts of Appeals have applied these
three exceptions using a variety of rationales, resulting in
a variety of outcomes. 1 5 For example, the circuits disa-
gree as to whether an airplane is analogous to an automo-
bile, and thus, whether the automobile exception applies
98 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 n. 1 (1978); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (the defendant admitted that he had no subjective expec-
tation of privacy; therefore, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy).
1m) See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) (stating that the police
bear a heavy burden in justifying warrantless arrests and searches).
-o See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for a summary of exceptions to
the warrant requirement.
-1 See infra notes 133-249 and accompanying text for a discussion of the auto-
mobile exception.
02 See infra notes 250-283 and accompanying text for a discussion of searches
incident to arrest.
,- See infra notes 284-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain
view doctrine.
104 For a critical review of the Supreme Court's fourth amendment decisions,
see Note, supra note 1; at 105. For references to criticisms of the Supreme Court's
fourth amendment holdings, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
lo-, See infra notes 159-163 for a summary of the circuits' opinions regarding the
automobile exception as applied to airplanes; infra notes 250-283 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of searches incident to arrest; infra notes 284-316 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the plain view doctrine.
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to aircraft searches.10 6 The primary disagreement con-
cerns whether significant differences in mobility exist be-
tween airplanes and automobiles.'o7
Another difficulty in placing parameters on aircraft
searches stems from the Supreme Court's bright line rules
regarding the searches of automobiles incident to
arrest.' 8 These rules allow the search of the entire pas-
senger section, including the glove compartment'0 9 and
containers inside the passenger section." 0 In the applica-
tion of the search incident to arrest exception to aircraft,
however, none of the circuits have addressed the permis-
sible parameters of an airplane search."'
The Supreme Court's parameters for applying the plain
view doctrine to automobiles are also difficult to apply to
airplanes. " 12 For example, under the plain view doctrine,
items plainly visible to persons passing by are not consid-
ered discoveries resulting from a search for the purposes
of the fourth amendment." No search is deemed to have
occurred because the passerby inadvertently discovered
the items and was not trespassing at the time."I4 Air-
planes, however, are more difficult to peer into than
automobiles, which raises the issue of whether climbing
onto the wing of an aircraft to look inside constitutes a
,oi See infra notes 158-166 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether an
airplane is the functional equivalent of an automobile.
.... See infra notes 169-225 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mobil-
ity rationale and the differences in mobility between airplanes and automobiles.
'I'm See infra notes 250-257 and accompanying text for a discussion of searches of
automobiles incident to arrest.
,oil See infra notes 254, 277-279 and accompanying text for a discussion of glove
compartment searches; see also Alschuler, supra note 30, at 227.
10 See infra notes 254-255 and accompanying text for a discussion of searches of
containers inside a vehicle.
It See infra notes 261-283 and accompanying text for the Eleventh Circuit's ap-
plication of the search incident to arrest exception to airplanes.
1"2 See infra notes 284-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain
view doctrine.
"1 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
,,4 See id; infra notes 284-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of apply-
ing of the plain view doctrine to automobile searches.
trespass. "15
The circuits have also applied other warrant require-
ment exceptions to airplane search. The major issue con-
cerning consent searches is determining who has the
authority to give consent to searches." 6 Border searches
are controverial for all types of vehicles, but are beyond
the scope of this Comment.' 17 Administrative inventory
searches do not appear to be controversial when applied
to airplanes."18  Limited intrusion, or "stop and frisk"
searches,"19 and the open fields doctrine 120 have also been
applied to airplanes.
B. Probable Cause
Probable cause is required to obtain a search warrant
and to justify certain types of warrantless searches. Two
types of probable cause exist: probable cause to search
and probable cause to arrest. Probable cause to search ex-
ists when an officer is presented with sufficient underlying
facts and circumstances from which a reasonable person
".- See infra notes 286-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether
climbing onto the wing of an aircraft constitutes a trespass.
I See infra notes 344-348 and accompanying text for a discussion of consent
searches.
117 See infra notes 349-358 and accompanying text for a discussion of border
searches. Border searches include a number of controversial issues, including: (1)
determining whether a vehicle actually crossed an international border; (2) how
long a detention is permissible; and (3) the scope of the search. While the law
regarding border searches is not settled and is quite controversial, a full discus-
sion of this area is beyond the scope of this Comment. For further information
regarding border searches see 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 3.9(f);
Mandell & Richardson, Lengthy Detentions and Invasive Searches at the Border: In Search
of the Magistrate, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 331 (1986); Comment, United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez: The Border Search Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 12 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 395 (1986); Note, Reasonable: A Different Meaning at the
Border, CRIM. JUST. J. 363 (1986); Note, Intrusive Border Searches - What Protection
Remains for the International Traveler Entering the United States after United States v. Mon-
toya de Hernandez and Its Progeny?, VAND. J. TRANSN'L L. 551 (1987).
,I See infra notes 334-340 and accompanying text for a discussion of adminis-
trative inventory searches.
'" See infra notes 317-333 and accompanying text for a discussion of limited
intrusion or "stop and frisk" searches.
,20 See infra notes 341-343 and accompanying text for a discussion of the open
fields doctrine.
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would conclude that seizable evidence will be found on
the premises or person to be searched. 2 1 Probable cause
to arrest exists when, at the time of arrest, the facts and
circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge,
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information,
are sufficient to induce a prudent person to believe that
the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. 22
To justify a search conducted pursuant to the automo-
bile exception, an officer must have probable cause to
search;2 3 and to justify a search incident to arrest, he
must have probable cause to arrest. 24 The other excep-
tions to the warrant requirement do not have a probable
cause requirement. 125
To search an automobile pursuant to the automobile
exception, an officer must first have probable cause to
search the automobile. 26 An officer has probable cause
121 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56, 162 (1925).
"22 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91 (1964) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949),
which actually describes probable cause to search).
12 See, e.g., Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 (1980); Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979) (holding that an officer may search an automobile if he
has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband, evidence of a
crime, or other seizable items), modified, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982) (upholding the result of Sanders, but rejecting the rationale, to which only a
plurality had agreed). For further discussion of the probable cause requirement
for an automobile exception search, see infra notes 142-144 and accompanying
text.
124 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (a full search of a per-
son incident to a lawful arrest is reasonable and is recognized as an exception to
the warrant requirement); see infra notes 258-260 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the probable cause requirement and searches incident to arrest.
212 For a discussion of general considerations concerning probable cause, see 1
W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 3.3. Probable cause is usually inherent in
hot pursuit searches because an officer does not ordinarily pursue a suspect unless
he has probable cause to believe the suspect may have committed a crime. Prob-
able cause is not a relevant factor for consent searches because an officer may
always search the premises if he has permission from someone who has the au-
thority to give permission. The courts have waived the probable cause require-
ment for administrative inventory searches, border searches, and the open fields
doctrine. No probable cause to search is necessary under the plain view doctrine
because no "search" exists for the purposes of the fourth amendment. Limited
intrusion or "stop and frisk" searches may be conducted based upon a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Id.
,' Carroll v. United States, 367 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
to search if he reasonably believes that contraband, evi-
dence of a crime, or other seizable items are inside the
automobile.' 27 The Court's original reason for allowing
an automobile search based solely upon probable cause
was that the mobility of an automobile created exigent cir-
cumstances. 128 The Court later added discussions of re-
duced expectations of privacy inside automobiles to its
rationale. 129
Before an officer may search a person incident to arrest,
he must first make a lawful arrest. 3 0 If the officer has not
obtained an arrest warrant, he must have probable cause
to believe that the suspect is committing or has committed
a crime for which he can be arrested, or the arrest is not
legal.13' Similarly, before an officer may search an auto-
mobile incident to the arrest of a driver or passenger, the
officer must first make a lawful arrest. 3 2
C. Automobile/Vehicle Exception
In 1925, the Supreme Court recognized a "movable
vessel" exception to the warrant requirement in Carroll v.
United States.' 33 Carroll involved federal prohibition of-
ficers who, after several months of surveillance, stopped
and searched the defendant's automobile, where they
found bottles of illegal liquor. 134 The Court justified the
warrantless search of the automobile by finding that de-
fendants or their confederates could have easily moved
the car and removed or destroyed the evidence before the
officer could obtain a warrant. 35
127 Id.
1'2 Id. at 153; see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753, 763 (1979), modified,
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
1211 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65.
1.10 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224, 235.
, Id. at 235.
112 Id.; see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981).
,". 267 U.S. 132 (1925). For further discussion of the automobile exception,
see 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 3.7(b).
267 U.S. at 134-36.
'. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153; see also Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762 (discussing Carroll, as
well as reduced expectations of privacy).
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An officer must meet only one requirement before con-
ducting a search pursuant to the automobile exception: he
must have probable cause to believe that the vehicle con-
tains the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime, evidence of
a crime, or contraband. 3 6 The Supreme Court has built
its rationale for the automobile exception on two different
bases. Initially, the Court held that the mobility of an au-
tomobile gives rise to exigent circumstances, thus justify-
ing the officer's failure to obtain a warrant.' 37 The Court
later added, as a second basis, that a person has a lower
expectation of privacy in his automobile than in his home
or office.' 38 As reasons for a reduced expectation of pri-
vacy in automobiles, the Court has mentioned both the
public nature and the amount of governmental regulation
of automobiles, including licensing and other motor vehi-
cle regulations. 139
The scope of a search conducted pursuant to the auto-
mobile exception is often confused with the scope of a
search performed incident to arrest. The primary differ-
ence between these two exceptions is that the automobile
exception allows a search of the entire automobile, in-
cluding the trunk,140 while a search incident to arrest al-
lows a search of only the passenger compartment
(including the glove compartment and containers inside
the passenger compartment). 4 ' Another important dif-
,'- See 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 3.7(b), at 277; see, e.g., Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (police may search for and seize contraband
and the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155-56 (1925)
(official must have probable cause to believe that the automobile is carrying con-
traband or illegal merchandise).
,.17 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153; see also Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761.
1-18 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761; see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394
(1985) (motor home has lower expectations of privacy); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (privacy interests in packages and containers inside an auto-
mobile must give way if officers have reason to believe they contain contraband).
But cf United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (no decreased expectation
of privacy is associated with a footlocker simply because it is placed inside an
automobile).
139 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
I'll United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 n.28 (1982).
14, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 (1981); see infra notes 250-283
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ference between the two exceptions is that in order to
conduct a search incident to arrest, an officer must first
have probable cause to arrest the suspect, but does not
have to establish independent probable cause to search. 142
In an automobile exception search, however, an officer
may conduct a search without making an arrest, but he
must have probable cause to search the automobile. 143
Furthermore, an officer's subsequent observations may al-
low probable cause to search to ripen, even when an auto-
mobile is stopped for a reason that ordinarily does not
give rise to establishing probable cause, such as a traffic
violation. 144
In addition to warrantless automobile searches, the
Supreme Court has addressed warrantless searches of
motor homes and boats. In California v. Carney,145 the
Court held that the police could conduct a warrantless
search of a motor home parked in a public lot. 146 The po-
lice placed the motor home under surveillance while try-
ing to apprehend Carney, who was suspected of soliciting
sex from boys. Police confirmed their suspicions when
they questioned a boy who was leaving the motor home.
The officers arrested Carney and, without first obtaining a
warrant, searched the motor home. The Court upheld the
search, holding that Carney had a reduced expectation of
privacy inside the motor home. 147 The Court also held
that a motor home in a public parking lot is more compa-
and accompanying text for a discussion of searches of vehicles incident to arrest;
see also 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 3.7(a), at 275-76.
142 See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973). For a discussion of establishing probable cause to arrest and searches
incident to arrest, see infra notes 258-260 and accompanying text. See also 1 W.
LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, §§ 3.3, 3.5, 3.7(a); Note, supra note 1, at 119-22.
14 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925); 1 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 3.7(b).
144 See, e.g., Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (per curiam) (while
issuing a citation for speeding, the officer saw items inside the vehicle that
matched the description of items reported stolen; this observation gave rise to
probable cause to search).
14-1 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
.. Id. at 389.
,47 Id. at 392-94.
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rable to a movable automobile than to a home. 48
The Supreme Court also upheld the warrantless search
of a private sailboat in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez.149
Pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), the Coast Guard has statu-
tory authority to search vessels on the high seas and in
waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. 50
Congress also granted customs officers the authority to
search any vessel in United States or customs waters, pur-
suant to 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a).1 5' Section 1581(a) allows
customs officers to board vessels within United States or
148 Id.
141, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); see also Note, supra note 51, at 617.
14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982). Section 89(a) provides:
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over
which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detec-
tion, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States. For
such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any
time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the
operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those
on board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine,
inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel
compliance. When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or
search it appears that a breach of the laws of the United States ren-
dering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by
any person, such person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore,
shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful
and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a
breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so as to
render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on
board of, or brought into the United States by, such vessel, liable to
forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty
and if necessary to secure such fine or penalty, such vessel or such
merchandise, or both, shall be seized.
Id.
,d15 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). Section 1581(a) provides:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel
or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs
waters or, as he may be authorized, within a customs-enforcement
area established under the Anti-Smuggling Act [19 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.], or at any other authorized place, without as well as within his
district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers
and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part
thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to
this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all neces-
sary force to compel compliance.
Id. (brackets in original).
customs waters to examine required documents and in-
spect the vessel, even if the officers do not have either rea-
sonable suspicion or probable cause to search. 5 2 Before
Villamonte-Marquez, courts had held that the fourth amend-
ment required at least reasonable suspicion to search a
boat. 5 '
In Villamonte-Marquez, United States customs officers
boarded a sailboat to check its documentation pursuant to
section 1581(a) while it was anchored eighteen miles in-
land near Lake Charles, Louisiana. 54  The officials
searched the boat and found 5,800 pounds of mari-
juana. 55 In upholding the search, the Court noted the
difficulty in drawing the line between pleasure boats, in
which a person would have a higher expectation of pri-
vacy, and commercial vessels, in which one would have a
lower expectation of privacy. 156 Thus, the Court held that
reasonable suspicion is not required to search either pri-
vate or commercial boats in United States or customs
waters. ' 5
7
To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
whether the automobile exception applies to aircraft.15 8
Five circuits, however, have addressed the issue: the
152 Id.
1. See Note, supra note 51, at 619-22.
54 Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 582-83.
' Id. at 583.
.. Id. at 592 n.6.
157 Id. at 592-93.
1". The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the following aircraft search cases:
United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486 (11 th Cir.) (search pursuant to warrant),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985); United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530 (11 th Cir.)
(automobile exception and search incident to arrest), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933
(1983); United States v. Bachner, 706 F.2d 1121 (11 th Cir.) (standing), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 896 (1983); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.) (auto-
mobile exception), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824
(1984); United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir.) (plain view doc-
trine), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977); United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d 1385 (5th
Cir. 1976) (standing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); United States v. Coplen,
541 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1976) (exigent circumstances), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977); United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1976) (exigent circum-
stances), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977); United States v. Sigal, 500 F.2d 1118
(10th Cir.) (automobile exception), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 954 (1974); United States
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Fifth, 59 Sixth, 160 Ninth,' 6 ' Tenth, 62 and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. 163 With the exception of the Fifth Circuit, these
courts agree that the automobile exception should apply
in some manner to airplanes. The circuits base their ra-
tionales for extending the exception to aircraft on the air-
craft's mobility or exigent circumstances. An airplane is
similar to an automobile in many respects, including its
mobility and its use as a transportation vehicle. Airplanes,
v. Cusanelli, 357 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (border search), aft'd, 472 F.2d
1204 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
1- United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 721 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1092 (1977). The Fifth Circuit did not extend the automobile exception to
airplanes because it declined to hold that an automobile is the functional
equivalent of an airplane. The court, however, justified the warrantless search
based on exigent circumstances, which was also part of the basis for creating the
automobile exception. Id. at 721 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967));
see supra note 137 and accompanying text for a discussion of exigent circum-
stances; infra notes 226-231 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brennan; see
also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (the mobility of an automobile
was held to give rise to exigent circumstances).
" United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 105-07 (6th Cir. 1984). The Sixth
Circuit focused on an airplane's mobility in applying the automobile exception to
aircraft, even though the aircraft at issue was secure and unlikely to be moved. See
infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's
decisions.
-1 The Ninth Circuit decided that exigent circumstances existed because the
vehicle was movable, despite the fact that the plane was secure when searched.
United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
836 (1978), overruled on other grounds, United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,
1205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); see infra notes 204-213 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's rationale.
162 The Tenth Circuit based its decisions primarily on the mobility of an air-
plane, but also discussed reduced expectations of privacy. United States v.
Finefrock, 668 F.2d 1168, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 1982) (exigent circumstances and
reduced expectations of privacy); United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 124 (10th
Cir. 1979) (mobility and reduced expectations of privacy); United States v. Sigal,
500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.) (mobility of aircraft gave rise to exigent circumstances),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 954 (1974); see infra notes 169-191 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's rationale.
16 The Eleventh Circuit first extended the automobile exception to airplanes in
an unpublished district court decision. United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530, 534
(11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (citing the unpublished opinion that
was affirmed without comment in United States v. Olson, 670 F.2d 185 (11 th Cir.
1982)). The Rollins court stated no reasons for extending the automobile excep-
tion to airplanes, but said that it could "see no difference between the exigent
circumstances of a car and an airplane." Rollins, 699 F.2d at 534; see infra notes
214-225 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's
decisions.
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however, differ from automobiles in several significant
respects.
One major difference is that fewer people are licensed
to fly an airplane than are licensed to drive an automo-
bile, 164 primarily because airplanes are more difficult to
operate and require more pilot training. Another differ-
ence is that although airplanes are generally restricted to
airports, landing strips, and other flat areas for takeoff
and landing, after takeoff they can travel in any direction
and along any route they choose. 165 Furthermore, they
can travel greater distances in a shorter time than
automobiles. 66 The courts have not addressed whether
these differences in mobility are significant for the pur-
poses of the fourth amendment.
With respect to the second rationale underlying the au-
tomobile exception, the courts have not directly ad-
dressed the issue of expectations of privacy. Because
airplanes are more highly regulated than automobiles, a
person should have even lower expectation of privacy in
an airplane than in an automobile. Many differences be-
tween automobiles and airplanes, however, might give
rise to an increased expectation of privacy in an airplane.
One difference is that many airports and hangars have
restricted access, which might increase expectations of
privacy at these locations. Another important difference
is that airplanes usually are much larger than
automobiles. 67 The courts, however, have not addressed
how large an area of an airplane may be searched pursu-
ant to the automobile exception. Officers may search any
area of an automobile, including the trunk and containers,
in which they have probable cause to believe they may
find contraband, evidence of a crime, or other seizable
I- See United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 124-25 (10th Cir. 1979).
165 Id.
"6' ld.
167 See, e.g., United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 101 (6th Cir. 1984) (a four-
engine DC-6 cargo plane was used in smuggling narcotics).
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items. 168 The courts have not indicated whether similar
parameters apply to airplane searches.
From the five circuits that have addressed these issues,
a variety of rationales and results have emerged. The fol-
lowing is a brief survey of how these circuits have applied
the automobile exception to aircraft.
1. Tenth Circuit: The Mobility Rationale
In a 1974 decision, United States v. Sigal,16 9 the Tenth
Circuit became the first circuit to explicitly extend the au-
tomobile exception to airplanes. Customs agents placed
Sigal's Piper Cherokee-6 under surveillance after an agent
noticed flattened boxes' inside and that the passenger
seats were removed. Agents followed Sigal for several
days, observed him load several boxes into his airplane in
Los Angeles, and followed him to Grants, New Mexico.
At the Grants airport, an agent looked into the airplane
and saw numerous boxes inside. 70 The agent reported
that he detected a "strong odor of marijuana" from the
airplane's vents and decided to search the airplane, even
though he had no warrant. 71 After finding the door to
the aircraft locked, the agent opened the unlocked bag-
gage compartment and found a sealed box. The agent
opened the box and found marijuana inside. 7 2
Sigal contended that the warrantless search violated his
fourth amendment rights and moved to exclude from evi-
dence the 445 pounds of marijuana found during the
search. 73 The court held that the automobile exception
applied to the warrantless search and therefore the evi-
dence obtained was admissible. While the court implied
that a reduced expectation of privacy existed inside an air-
'6 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-24 (1982) (container searches);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (trunk searches).
-9' 500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 954 (1974).
170 Id. at 1120.
171 Id. at 1120-21.
172 Id. at 1121.
,7.1 Id. at 1119, 1121.
COMMENTS
plane, 174 the primary basis for the decision was the air-
plane's mobility.' 75  The court stated that an airplane
could travel great distances in any direction, to unknown
destinations.1 76 The court concluded that this high de-
gree of mobility gave rise to exigent circumstances, which
justified the search in the same manner as an automobile
search would be justified. 1 77 It is interesting to note that
the defendant did not challenge the opening of the sealed
box, in which he might have claimed a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. 78
Five years after Sigal, the Tenth Circuit addressed simi-
lar issues in United States v. Gooch.' 79 After radar tracking
an airplane travelling north from Mexico, federal agents
dispatched aircraft to intercept the suspect airplane.
When the airplane landed, Gooch jumped out and at-
tempted to flee, dropping a bag as he left the airplane.
The agents arrested both Gooch and the pilot. A subse-
quent search of the airplane revealed 1,185 pounds of
marijuana. 180
In its analysis, the court noted that an airplane is less
mobile than an automobile in some respects because
fewer people can operate airplanes than automobiles.' 8 '
The court further noted that once it leaves the ground, an
airplane is more mobile than an automobile because it can
travel greater distances in a shorter time and is not re-
stricted to roadways. 8 2 The airplane in Gooch, however,
was secured and the pilot was under arrest when the of-
174 Id. at 1121. The court compared the greater expectation of privacy in a
home with the lower expectation of privacy in an automobile. Id.
17- Id. at 1121-22. The court stated that "the mobility of the thing searched in
the instant case is a most significant factor in determining whether [agent]
Weatherman's search of Sigal's aircraft was constitutionally permissible." Id.
176 id. at 1122.
177 Id. at 1121-22.
178 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (discussing searches of con-
tainers and reasonable expectations of privacy); supra notes 33-39 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of reasonable expectations of privacy.
171) 603 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979).
18o Id. at 123.
18, Id. at 124-25.
192 Id.
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ficers conducted their search.' 83  Although the court
noted problems with deciding the case on the basis of mo-
bility alone, the decision was based primarily on this ra-
tionale.1 84  The court, however, also discussed a person's
reduced expectations of privacy inside airplanes. Therea-
sons given for these reduced expectations were the public
nature of airplanes and the amount of governmental regu-
lation of airplanes. 8 5
In United States v. Finefrock,'8 6 however, the Tenth Cir-
cuit abandoned its hesitance to base decisions regarding
secured aircraft solely on the mobility rationale. Even
though the Finefrock airplane was secure, the court based
its decision solely on 'mobility and made no mention what-
soever of lower expectations of privacy. 8 7 Officers sus-
pected that Finefrock was transporting narcotics and
waited for his airplane to land. After the airplane landed,
the officers peered inside and observed marijuana stems
protruding from containers. The officers arrested
Finefrock and searched the airplane two hours later, with-
out first obtaining a warrant.'
The court justified the search under the automobile ex-
'" Id. at 124.
14 Id. at 124-25 n.3. In footnote 3, the court discusses its concerns over mobil-
ity being the determinative factor in this type of case. In Gooch the airplane was
secure, and the court believed that actual mobility was not an issue. The court,
however, felt bound to follow the rationale of Chambers v. Maroney and decided the
case primarily on the inherent mobility of airplanes and secondarily on reduced
expectations of privacy, which the Tenth Circuit believed was a more appropriate
rationale. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970). Chambers, how-
ever, does not expressly preclude a rationale based on reduced expectations of
privacy. Furthermore, the court in Gooch also cited Arkansas v. Sanders, which dis-
cusses both mobility and reduced expectations of privacy. Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979).
-s Gooch, 603 F.2d at 125 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)).
The court concluded that the reduced expectations of privacy associated with
automobiles also applied to airplanes, but gave no reasons for this conclusion.
Id.; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (an automobile's
"function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the re-
pository of personal effects") (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974)).
.. 668 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1982).
187 Id. at 1171-72.
"' Id. at 1170.
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ception. 8 9 Although the airplane in Finefrock was secure
and in no danger of being moved, as was the airplane in
United States v. Gooch, the court did not question the mobil-
ity rationale as it had in Gooch. 90 Instead, the court held
that because of the potential mobility of the vehicle, exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless search. 9
2. Sixth Circuit: The Mobility Rationale
As did the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit relied upon
the mobility rationale to justify aircraft searches, even
when the aircraft were secured and only potentially mo-
bile. The Sixth Circuit first addressed airplane searches in
United States v. Cusanelli 192 in 1973. Although the court
mentioned Carroll v. United States and Chambers v. Maroney
to support its opinion, it never developed an analysis be-
yond discussing probable cause. 93  In fact, the court
never mentioned the automobile exception in its opinion.
The only indications that it might be relying on this ex-
ception were references to Carroll and Chambers in its dis-
cussion of probable cause. 94 .
In 1984, the Sixth Circuit explicitly extended the auto-
mobile exception to aircraft in United States v. Nigro. 195 An
FAA official noticed that a four-engine DC-6 at Memphis
International Airport had a defective propeller and nu-
I 9 ld. at 1171-72.
See id.
Id. at 1171. The court said that it could not distinguish the present case
from Chambers v. Maroney, which held that the search was justified because of the
automobile's mobility. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50 (1970) (holding
that an automobile's mobility justifies warrantless searches when probable cause
to search exists); supra notes 179-185 and accompanying text for discussion of
Gooch.
1..2 357 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
,:'.- Cusanelli, 357 F. Supp. at 680-81. Probable cause to search is the only re-
quirement necessary to conduct an automobile exception search. The Cusanelli
court, however, never clearly expressed whether it was basing its opinion on the
automobile exception or some other exception, or creating a new exception to the
warrant requirement. See id.; supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Carroll; supra notes 184 and 191 for a discussion of Chambers.
194 See Cusanelli, 357 F. Supp. at 680-81.
1115 727 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1984).
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merous nicks, indicating that it had been landing on
gravel airstrips. 1 9 6 The official also observed that the pilot
had followed an unusual landing pattern and had not no-
tified the tower that his propeller was malfunctioning, as
was conventional practice.1 97 When the official ques-
tioned the pilot and asked for required documents, the
pilot was evasive and failed to produce the documents. 98
A customs agent then inspected the exterior of the air-
plane, opened the cargo belly, and found marijuana deb-
ris. 199 Officials arrested the pilot and searched the
plane. 20 0
In its analysis, the court noted that a number of courts
of appeals had applied the automobile exception to air-
planes. It then adopted its own version of the exception.
First, the court concluded that an unoccupied parked air-
plane is less mobile than a similarly situated automobile
because fewer people are capable of flying an airplane
than driving a car. Next, the court stated that once an air-
plane is airborne, it is considerably more mobile than an
automobile because it can cover greater distances in a
shorter time and is not restricted to existing roadways. Fi-
nally, the court concluded that because of the public na-
ture of airports, a person should have a lower expectation
of privacy in an airplane. 20 ' The court based its opinion
solely on the mobility rationale, however, because it be-
lieved that the Supreme Court had placed the reduced ex-
pectation of privacy justification in doubt in United States v.
Ross. °2 This reasoning is quite similar to the Tenth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in United States v. Gooch, except that the
1x Id. at 101-02.
1,7 Id. at 101.
11,8 Id. at 101-02.
ol Id. at 102.
201) Id.
2.. Id. at 107.
21.. Id.; see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (holding that "an
individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if
probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband");
supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy.
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Sixth Circuit did not appear to be concerned that the air-
plane was secured and, therefore, only potentially
mobile. °s
3. Ninth Circuit: Movable Vehicle Exception
The Ninth Circuit, like the Tenth and Sixth Circuits,
based its reasoning on the potential mobility of an air-
plane in adopting what it termed the "moving vehicle" ex-
ception in United States v. Flickinger.2 0 4  The factual
situation in Flickinger is similar to the one the Supreme
Court addressed regarding automobiles in 1971 in Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire.20 5 The Flickinger opinion, however,
makes only passing reference to Coolidge.20 6 A four-mem-
ber plurality in Coolidge attempted to distinguish between
a moving vehicle and a movable vehicle, but the majority
of the Court has never recognized this distinction.0 7 In
Coolidge, police arrested the defendant and two days later
searched his car without first obtaining a warrant.20 8 The
majority of the Court held that the search was not justified
under either the search incident to arrest exception or the
automobile exception because the car was parked in the
driveway and there was little likelihood that anyone would
drive the vehicle away.20 9 The Coolidge plurality distin-
guished searching a car parked in a driveway when the
owner is in jail from stopping a car on the open road and
searching it contemporaneously because of exigent
circumstances. 1 0
In Flickinger, the airplane was parked and the occupants
were not in the immediate area at the time of the
203 See supra notes 179-185 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gooch.
2,,4 573 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 824 (1984).
205 403 U.S. 443, 445-48 (1971).
206 Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1357.
2(17 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461 n. 18. The four-member plurality consisted of Jus-
tices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart. Id.
208 Id. at 447-48.
20' Id. at 457, 463-64.
2 0 Id. at 461 n.18.
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search.21 ' The defendants had used the plane earlier dur-
ing the day of their arrest, but were arrested at their
home, which was nowhere near the airplane.21 2 The
court, however, held that the "moving vehicle" exception
justified the warrantless search because exigent circum-
stances, specifically that the vehicle was capable of being
moved, excused the lack of a warrant. 13
4. Eleventh Circuit: Applying the Automobile Exception
The Eleventh Circuit has also applied the automobile
exception to aircraft, and has focused on both probable
cause and mobility to justify its holdings. In an unpub-
lished 1982 decision, United States v. Olson,2 14 a district
court held that the automobile exception included air-
planes. A subsequent case, United States v. Rollins,215 relied
upon Olson and the automobile exception to justify war-
rantless searches of airplanes.216
Based on an unnamed informant's tip that Rollins and
codefendant Thomas would fly from one Alabama airport
to another with a pound of cocaine, federal agents began
surveillance at both airports.2 17 Agents observed their
flight from the first airport to the second, corroborating
the tip. 2 18 Agents at the second airport watched them
leave the airplane with a brown satchel and paper bag,
and enter a car occupied by a known drug trafficker.
When Rollins and Thomas left the car, boarded their air-
plane, and prepared to take off, the agents approached
211 Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1353.
212 Id.
21- Id. at 1357.
2 4 670 F.2d 185 (11th Cir.) (memorandum decision denying the defendant's
appeal), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110 (1982). The district court's opinion is not
published.
21- United States v. Thomas, 536 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983)
(Rollins and Thomas were codefendants and coappellees).
21, Rollins, 699 F.2d at 534; Thomas, 536 F. Supp. at 743. Both the district court
and the Eleventh Circuit cited Olson, but neither gave any indication as to the basis
for Olson's application of the automobile exception to airplanes.
217 Rollins, 699 F.2d at 531.
218 Id. at 531-32.
the airplane. One agent, following standard procedures,
climbed onto the airplane's wing to check for possible
confederates aboard. The agent saw a bag containing a
white powder, which he believed to be cocaine, and en-
tered the airplane to confirm his belief. The agents then
arrested the suspects and obtained a search warrant to
search the rest of the airplane.2"9
The court upheld the warrantless search based on both
the automobile exception and search incident to arrest ex-
ception. 220 While the Eleventh Circuit gave no rationale
for upholding the search pursuant to the automobile ex-
ception, it did not dispute the district court's holding that
the search was legal because of the difficulty involved in
securing a movable vehicle while an officer obtains a war-
rant.22' Rollins also helps to illustrate the confusion that
exists in differentiating the automobile exception and
searches of automobiles incident to arrest. In its holding,
the Eleventh Circuit states that "[b]ecause the search was
based on a legal arrest supported by probable cause ...
we conclude that the search was within the bounds of both
'search incident to an arrest' and the 'automobile excep-
tion.' ",222 As discussed previously, probable cause to
arrest is distinguishable from probable cause to search.223
Probable cause to search is a prerequisite to a valid auto-
mobile exception search, but probable cause to arrest does
not necessarily imply that probable cause to search ex-
ists. 22 4 While the Eleventh Circuit's outcome in Rollins is
probably correct, its reasoning and use of terminology are
not.2 2
5
21.. Id. at 532.
220 Id. at 534; see infra notes 250-283 and accompanying text for a discussion of
searches incident to arrest.
2 Thomas, 536 F. Supp. at 742.
222 Rollins, 699 F.2d at 534.
223 See supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of probable
cause.
224 See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a discussion of probable cause
to search and the automobile exception.
225 While the search should not be justified as a search incident to arrest, as
discussed infra notes 250-283, the search could be justified under the automobile
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5. Fifth Circuit: Exigent Circumstances Rationale
The Fifth Circuit addressed the application of the auto-
mobile exception to aircraft in United States v. Brennan.22 6
In this case, an informant contacted federal officials and
told them that he suspected Brennan would soon engage
in smuggling activities. When Brennan departed in his
airplane approximately one month later, federal agents
tried to track the flight but failed. The next day Brennan
returned to the airport, parked his airplane in the hangar,
and attempted to leave. While other agents detained
Brennan, one agent searched the aircraft. Upon discover-
ing marijuana and hashish in the airplane, the agents
placed him under arrest. 227
The Fifth Circuit held that exigent circumstances justi-
fied the search of the aircraft, but declined to hold that
"an airplane is the legal equivalent of an automobile. '228
The court held that the agents were justified in allowing
Brennan to park the airplane in the hangar rather than
trying to stop him on the taxiway because of the potential
danger to the agents.229 In addition, very little time
elapsed between Brennan's detention and the search of
the airplane.2 30 The court further justified the immediate
search because two vehicles belonging to Brennan were
parked outside the hangar, indicating that confederates
might be present. In addition, the informant had said that
a large amount of narcotics would be smuggled, which
also indicated that confederates who could move or de-
stroy evidence might be present.23 ' Thus, the Fifth Cir-
exception as a potentially movable vehicle. See supra notes 169-213 and accompa-
nying text for other circuits' applications of the mobility rationale.
226 538 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977).
227 Id. at 714.
28 Id. at 721.
229 Id.
2-.0 Id.; cf Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 447-48, 456, 462-64
(1971) (two days elapsed between the arrest and search, which the Court held to
be too long a period of time).
21, Brennan, 538 F.2d at 721.
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cuit avoided addressing the mobility rationale, but
justified the search based on other exigent circumstances.
6. Analysis: Automobile Exception and Aircraft
The circuit courts have applied both of the rationales
for the automobile exception, mobility and reduced ex-
pectations of privacy, to aircraft searches. The Sixth and
Tenth Circuits based their decisions on the potential mo-
bility of an airplane, even when the airplane was secure
and not likely to be moved before a warrant could be ob-
tained.23 2 Both circuits emphasized that fewer people can
fly airplanes than can drive automobiles and that airplanes
can take off and land only in certain places.233 An air-
plane, however, is much more mobile once it is airborne
because it can cover greater distances in a shorter time
than an automobile and is not restricted to roadways.234
The Ninth Circuit, however, correctly noted that a sig-
nificant difference exists between a vehicle that is moving
and a vehicle that is movable.2 35 The exigent circumstances
that exist when an airplane is stopped on a runway, and,
therefore, is capable of taking off before a search can be
conducted, do not exist when an airplane is parked or
otherwise secured. 236
The Fifth Circuit also addressed an important concern
regarding the distinction between moving and movable
vehicles when it held that federal agents could first let a
pilot park an airplane and, thus, immobilize it. The court
232 See United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Finefrock, 668 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122
(10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sigal, 500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 954 (1974); supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Sixth Circuit's mobility rationale and notes 169-191 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's mobility rationale.
133 See supra notes 181 and 201 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 182 and 201 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 204-213 and accompanying text. The Coolidge plurality's dis-
tinction between moving and movable vehicles has not been adopted by a major-
ity of the Court.
236 See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dis-
tinction between movable and moving automobiles in Coolidge.
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held that this would be necessary in some circumstances
because of the dangers associated with approaching an
unsecured plane.2"7 For example, officers on the ground
cannot pursue an airplane if the pilot takes off when he
sees them approaching. In addition, a pilot could use the
airplane as a means of chasing and injuring officers. Fur-
thermore, an officer is not able to look inside an airplane
as easily as he can look inside an automobile when ap-
proaching the vehicle. Therefore, he cannot readily de-
termine whether the pilot or passengers are armed.
Although the Fifth Circuit declined to extend the auto-
mobile exception to airplanes, the "exigent circum-
stances" rationale it gave for justifying the warrantless
airplane search is virtually identical to the mobility ration-
ale given by the Supreme Court in early automobile
search cases. 2 38 For example, in Chambers v. Maroney,2 39
the Court held that an automobile's inherent mobilityjus-
tified the officers' taking it to the police station to conduct
a search instead of searching at the site of the stop.2 40
The mobility rationale has been criticized because it al-
lows officers to conduct searches when it is highly unlikely
that the vehicle will be moved before they can obtain a
search warrant.2 4 ' This criticism is especially applicable
to airplanes because fewer people can fly them and be-
cause at many airports airplanes must receive permission
from controllers before taking off.
The circuit courts focused on the actual and potential
mobility of airplanes to justify warrantless searches during
the 1970s and 1980s. A portion of the Supreme Court,
however, began to question this justification.242 A four-
member plurality of the Court in 1970 recognized a dis-
2137 See supra note 184 for a comparison with the Tenth Circuit's rationale.
238 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925),
2- 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
240 Id. at 52.
24, Note, supra note 1, at 111-13.
242 See supra notes 169-225 and accompanying text for circuit court opinions
based on mobility.
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tinction between moving and movable vehicles in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire.243 A majority of the Court, however, has
never accepted this distinction. Nevertheless, in 1979, the
Court began justifying warrantless automobile searches
based on a person's reduced expectation of privacy inside
an automobile, in addition to considering the vehicle's
mobility. 244 The Court also began to use the term "inher-
ent mobility" to justify warrantless searches of temporar-
ily immobile vehicles, apparently attempting to establish a
bright line rule to allow more searches based on probable
cause alone.24 5
Even though the mobility rationale does not always ap-
ply to airplanes as well as it does to automobiles, the ra-
tionale that people have lower expectations of privacy
inside airplanes can be more easily justified. Unlike vans,
mobile homes, or boats, airplanes are seldom used as liv-
ing quarters.24 6 Furthermore, the government regulates
airplanes more heavily than automobiles.247 These factors
tend to reduce expectations of privacy. One factor that
may increase expectations of privacy, however, is that air-
planes, especially larger ones, are more difficult to see
into than automobiles.
The justifications for warrantless automobile searches,
which are based on a combination of probable cause and
either exigent circumstances created by mobility or lower
expectations of privacy, also apply to airplanes.24 8 While
the courts have used these rationales to establish parame-
ters for automobile searches, they have given little gui-
dance regarding airplane searches. For example, police
24, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion of Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and
Stewart); see supra notes 205-213 and accompanying text.
244 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
.45 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
246 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 388, 392-94 (1985); supra notes 145-
148 and accompanying text.
247 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 21-43 (1988) (FAA airworthiness requirements). Air-
planes are subject to stricter licensing requirements, maintenance procedures,
and overall operating procedures than automobiles.
248 See supra notes 133-168 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
rationales.
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officers may search any part of an automobile, including
the trunk, in which they have reason to believe they might
find seizable items. 2 49 Extending these parameters to air-
planes would allow officers to search any part of an air-
plane in which they might expect to find seizable items.
Airplanes, however, are significantly different from
automobiles in that certain parts of an airplane, such as
parts of the wings, are crucial for safe flight. If officers
tamper with these areas during a search, the airplane's
safety during subsequent flight may be compromised.
Therefore, it would not be prudent to allow warrantless
searches of areas that involve tampering with the struc-
ture of the airplane. Instead, officers should be required
to procure a warrant if they wish to inspect areas that re-
quire removal of integral structural components.
D. Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest
1. Background
Searches incident to lawful arrest comprise another ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. Probable cause must
exist for the arrest, but independent probable cause to
search need not be demonstrated as long as the following
requirements are met.2 -0 First, the arrest must be a full
custodial arrest that is authorized by the offense for which
the suspect is arrested. 51 Second, the arrest must be
made legally, pursuant to either an arrest warrant or
probable cause to arrest without a warrant.25 2 Third, of-
ficers may conduct a full search of the suspect and the ar-
eas within his reach or control.253 The area of control
includes the entire passenger section of an automobile,
including the glove compartment, even if the arrestee is
249 See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
2.o See 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 3.7(a) (discussing searches of
vehicles incident to arrest); see also infra notes 258-260 and accompanying text for
a discussion of probable cause.
2, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
2-52 Id. at 235-36.
25 Id. at 235; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,. 762-63 (1969).
not in or near the automobile at the time of the search.254
In addition, officers may search containers inside the pas-
senger compartment if they have probable cause to be-
lieve the container has seizable evidence inside.255
Fourth, the search must be contemporaneous with the
arrest.256 If, however, a valid reason for delay exists, the
search may still be deemed incident to the arrest.
25 7
a. Probable Cause to Arrest
In cases involving aircraft searches incident to arrest,
two primary areas of concern involve establishing prob-
able cause to make the arrest and the scope of the search
after the arrest. While arrests made pursuant to a warrant
are preferred, officers often place airplanes under surveil-
lance based on less than probable cause. The decision to
begin surveillance may result from tips received from
anonymous or less than credible sources. The tips must
be sufficiently corroborated before probable cause can be
established.2 58  The practical problem is that an officer
must decide when probable cause has been established,
because if he arrests the suspect before establishing prob-
able cause, the arrest will be declared illegal and any evi-
dence found cannot be used against the suspect.259 If, on
the other hand, the officer waits too long, the suspect may
escape. Thus, officers frequently do not have time to pro-
cure arrest warrants and must make arrests based on
probable cause alone.260
2,54 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
25-5 Id. at 460 n.4 (a container includes the closed or open glove compartment,
consoles, luggage, boxes, bags, and clothing, but not the trunk of the
automobile).
256 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
257 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974).
"5 See supra notes 169-225 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mobil-
ity of aircraft.
259 See supra notes 251-252 and accompanying text for a discussion of warrant-
Jess arrests and notes 45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine; see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313
(1959).
2W See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
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b. Scope of Search
The second area of interest concerning searches of air-
planes incident to arrest is the scope of the search. The
Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue in United States v. Rol-
lins.26' Before arresting the suspects Thomas and Rollins,
an officer climbed onto the airplane's wing and saw a bag
of white powder.262 He then boarded the plane and de-
termined that the bag contained cocaine. Officers then
arrested the suspects and procured a warrant to search
the rest of the airplane. As codefendants, Thomas and
Rollins claimed that the original search violated their
fourth amendment rights.263
The Eleventh Circuit apparently extended to airplanes
the New York v. Belton rule,264 which allows a search of the
entire passenger compartment incident to a suspect's
arrest.265 The court, however, gave no explanation for ex-
tending the rule but merely affirmed the district court's
decision of United States v. Thomas.266 In Thomas, the dis-
trict court based its reasoning on a rather confusing com-
bination of the automobile exception 267 and the Belton
rule.268 The court first stated that the Eleventh Circuit
had extended the automobile exception to airplanes in a pre-
vious case. 269 Then it stated that the passenger compart-
U.S. 849 (1985); United States v. Walden, 707 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Groomer, 596 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1979).
2C' United States v. Thomas, 536 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983)
(Rollins and Thomas were codefendants and coappellees); see supra notes 215-219
for further discussion of the facts in Rollins and Thomas.
26 Rollins, 699 F.2d at 532.
263 Id.
2- 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see supra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
26 Id. at 460-61.
2- 536 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Rollins,
699 F.2d 530 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983).
267 See supra notes 133-245 and accompanying text for a discussion of the auto-
mobile exception; supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text, which detail the
difference between the automobile exception and searches incident to arrest.
2 6 See supra notes 254-255 and 264-265 for a discussion of the Belton rule.
2-69 Thomas, 536 F. Supp. at 743. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the unpublished
district court's opinion extending the automobile exception to airplanes in United
States v. Olson, 670 F.2d 185 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110 (1982).
ment of a small airplane should be treated in the same
manner as the passenger compartment of a car when it is
searched incident to arrest.27' Thus, the district court pro-
duced a hybrid opinion that was based on two distinct ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement, the automobile
exception and searches incident to lawful arrest.
27
'
2. Analysis: Searches Incident to Arrest
The most apparent flaw in the Eleventh Circuit's ap-
proach is that it applied the search incident to arrest ex-
ception to a search that was conducted before the police
arrested the defendants. The exception should be ap-
plied only when a legal arrest is made first, followed by a
search. 72 Thomas and Rollins are also good examples of
the courts' confusion regarding the differences between
searches incident to arrest and automobile exception
searches. While both exceptions can apply to one search,
an analysis should distinguish the two exceptions because
the scope of each search is different.273 The automobile
exception as extended to airplanes would allow a search
of all areas of the airplane in which an officer reasonably
believed he might find seizable items.2 74 A search of an
airplane incident to arrest would be limited to the area
within the control of the pilot or other arrested suspect if
the rules for searches of automobiles incident to arrest ap-
ply.275 The area of control in an automobile consists of
270 Thomas, 536 F. Supp. at 743.
'' Id.; see supra notes 133-168 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
automobile exception; supra notes 250-257 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of searches incident to arrest.
272 See supra notes 250-257 and accompanying text for a discussion of searches
incident to arrest.
273 See supra notes 133-168 and accompanying text for a discussion of the auto-
mobile exception; supra notes 250-257 and accompanying text for a discussion of
searches incident to arrest; supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text for differ-
ences between the two exceptions.
274 See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text for the parameters of an au-
tomobile exception search.
275 See supra note 140 and accompanying text; see also Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (justifying the search of the area within the arrestee's
immediate control).
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the entire passenger compartment, including the glove
compartment and containers inside the passenger
compartment.276
The Supreme Court created the controversial bright
line rule allowing searches of the entire passenger com-
partment during a search incident to arrest in Belton.277
The original justifications for warrantless searches inci-
dent to arrest were to protect the officer from harm if the
arrestee had a weapon in the automobile and also to pre-
vent the destruction of evidence. 278 The Court, however,
created a bright line rule allowing the search of the entire
passenger compartment rather than limiting the search to
an area that might be within the suspect's reasonable or
probable reach. Allowing a search of the entire passenger
compartment of an airplane is more difficult to justify.
The passenger compartment of a medium-sized airplane
certainly extends well beyond the immediate reach or
control of the pilot.279 A search of the entire passenger
compartment of a large airplane might be justified, how-
ever, if officers reasonably believe that confederates could
be hiding in the airplane.28 0 Officers could then make a
cursory search of a large passenger compartment and pos-
sibly search further if seizable items were in plain view. 28 '
The officer could justify the more extensive search under
the plain view doctrine combined with the automobile ex-
ception. 8 Under this combination, any items discovered
276 See supra notes 141 and 255 and accompanying text.
277 See Note, supra note 1, at 119-22 (critical discussion of Belton).
278 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
279 See, e.g., United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1984) (a DC-6 was
used to smuggle narcotics); see supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Nigro. A DC-6 is approximately 100 feet long and has a
wingspan of approximately 117 feet. M. MONTGOMERY & G. FOSTER, A FIELD
GUIDE TO AIRPLANES 138 (1984).
o See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 721 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977). The Fifth Circuit allowed a warrantless search based
partially on the possibility that confederates might be present. Id.; see supra notes
226-231 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brennan.
2"11 See infra notes 284-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain
view doctrine.
2" See supra notes 133-249 and accompanying text for a discussion of the auto-
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in plain view would give the officer the probable cause
necessary to search the entire vehicle.283
E. Plain View Doctrine
1. Background
The plain view doctrine allows the seizure of items that
are either not described in a search warrant or are "inad-
vertently" found in plain view when the officer has no
warrant. Law officers must fulfill the following require-
ments to comply with the doctrine: (1) the officers must
have a legitimate reason for being where they are ("valid
prior intrusion"); (2) they must inadvertently discover the
objects seized ("in plain view"); and (3) it must be appar-
ent that the objects are evidence ("fruits or instrumentali-
ties of a crime"). 2 4 The doctrine is not an exception to
the warrant requirement because, for the purposes of the
fourth amendment, no search is considered to have been
made if all plain view doctrine requirements are met.2 5
One of the most important concerns is determining
whether the officer was legitimately on the premises at the
time he discovered the evidence.28 6 With respect to air-
craft, the most controversial issue is whether an officer is
allowed to climb onto the wing of an airplane to look in-
side.28 7 Some jurisdictions hold that, under certain cir-
mobile exception; infra notes 284-316 and accompanying text for discussion of the
plain view doctrine.
283 See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (per curiam). In Bannister
the Court allowed the warrantless search of an automobile after an officer stopped
the vehicle in order to issue the driver a citation for speeding. The officer noticed
items inside the automobile which matched the description of items which had
been reported stolen. The Court held that the officer's observations after stop-
ping the vehicle gave rise to probable cause to search. Id.; see supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
284 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971); 1 W. LAFAVE &J.
ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 3.2(b), at 166.
211. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 464-73.
86 Id. at 466 (the officer must have a "legitimate reason for being present").
287 See infra notes 288-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect
of an officer's presence on an airplane's wing.
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cumstances, an officer may climb on the wing.2 8 8 Other
jurisdictions, however, hold that an officer is not legiti-
mately on the premises when he is on the aircraft's wing
without permission, but instead has trespassed. 89
2. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit was one of the first circuits to con-
clude that, under some circumstances, an officer may
climb onto the wing to peer into the airplane. In United
States v. Bellina,290 an experienced drug enforcement of-
ficer inspected an airplane that he thought looked suspi-
cious because of damage to the propellers, landing gear,
and wing braces.2 9 ' Upon inspection, the officer observed
that the curtains were tightly drawn over the airplane's
windows, concluding that the pilot did not want the inte-
rior to be observed. To obtain a better look inside the
airplane, he climbed onto a wing. From this vantage
point, he saw marijuana inside the aircraft.292
Other jurisdictions might hold that, because the officer
had trespassed, the search was illegal.2 9 The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, employed a totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether the officer was justified in
climbing onto the wing.294 The court weighed such fac-
tors as the officer's experience, the suspicious condition
of the airplane, and the location of the airplane in an un-
lighted area, concluding that the officer had not unconsti-
tutionally intruded upon the defendant's fourth
amendment rights.295
288 United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bel-
lina, 665 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1985).
289 United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1113, 1125 (5th Cir. 1985).
2!,o 665 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1985).
291 Id. at 1337.
292 Id.
29-1 See infra notes 297-299 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fifth
Circuit's holding that climbing onto the aircraft's wing constitutes a trespass and
violates the fourth amendment.
294 Bellina, 665 F.2d at 1344 ("[t]he court must look at all the surrounding
circumstances").
211. Id. at 1344-45.
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3. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit considered a similar factual situation
in United States v. Amuny. 296 The Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) placed an electronic tracking device, com-
monly known as a beeper, on Amuny's twin-engine air-
craft and placed him under surveillance.29 7 When Amuny
returned to the airport from which he had originally de-
parted, agents surrounded his airplane. One agent
climbed onto the wing and saw several packages wrapped
in brown paper and encased in plastic, which he believed
contained contraband. Agents then entered the airplane
and seized the packages. The defendants claimed that the
officers' climbing onto the wing constituted a trespass and
therefore, the search and seizure were in violation of the
fourth amendment. 2 98 The court held that under most
circumstances climbing onto the wing of an airplane is a
trespass; therefore, the officer was not legitimately on the
premises .299
With respect to the use of electronic or other aids to
enhance one's vision, however, the Fifth Circuit has held
that these aids do not cause a search to be invalid for the
purposes of the fourth amendment.3 0 0 For example, in
United States v. Dorr,30 ' the Fifth Circuit held that the plain
view doctrine applies if the officer shines a flashlight from
the ground into the airplane, instead of climbing onto the
wing. 30
4. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit appears to have adopted a totality of
the circumstances test, similar to that of the Fourth Cir-
21)6 767 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1985).
2 7 Id. at 1117.
29 Id. at 1118.
21) Id. at 1128-29.
3 0 See supra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving
electronic surveillance devices.
3o, 636 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1981).
302 Id. at 121.
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cuit. In United States v. Smith,30 3 the court indicated that
climbing onto the wing of airplane would normally be
considered a trespass.3 4 In Smith, drug enforcement
agents followed Smith's Cessna twin-engine aircraft to the
Durango, Colorado airport, landing a few minutes after
the defendants. They found the Cessna parked at a public
tie-down. Believing that smugglers might be aboard the
aircraft, one agent climbed onto a wing and saw boxes in-
side, which he believed to contain contraband. 0 5 They
then towed the airplane to a nearby service building,
picked the lock, and searched the airplane, finding a large
amount of marijuana inside. 6
Smith challenged the warrantless search, claiming that
because the agent trespassed when he climbed onto the
wing, the plain view doctrine did not apply. 7 The court
held that the officer's reasonable belief that suspects
might be aboard constituted exigent circumstances, justi-
fying climbing onto the wing.308 The court concluded
that because the officer was legally on the wing, no tres-
pass occurred; therefore, the plain view doctrine
applied.39
5. Analysis: Plain View Doctrine
The plain view doctrine has been in an unsettled state
since Coolidge v. New Hampshire, in which the Supreme
Court failed to agree on the doctrine's application to an
automobile search.3 '0 The Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the application of the plain view doctrine to air-
plane searches, so automobile searches must be
considered by analogy. Airplanes are more difficult to
peer into than automobiles, thus, aircraft owners and pi-
303 797 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986).
3 0 Id. at 842.
30. Id. at 838.
3- Id. at 839.
307 Id.
-0s Id. at 841.
3o0 Id. at 843.
-io 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971); see supra note 285 and accompanying text.
lots do not consider most objects inside to be in plain
view. In addition, climbing onto an airplane's wing is
quite similar to trespassing upon a dwelling's curtilage,
which is defined as the area immediately surrounding the
dwelling.31 I Because entry is not allowed upon the curti-
lage for purposes of the plain view doctrine, climbing
onto an airplane's wing may be unlawful as well. 1 2
The Tenth Circuit allows an officer to climb onto a wing
when he is in pursuit of a suspect and believes that the
suspect or confederates might be aboard the airplane.1 3
Exigent circumstances, however, are not a recognized ex-
ception to the requirement that an officer must not be
trespassing when he observes the objects in plain view. It
should also be noted that the Tenth Circuit could have
justified the search in Smith as one conducted in hot pur-
suit of a suspect, and thus avoided having to address the
trespass issue.31 4 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's total-
ity of the circumstances test, which allows an officer to
trespass under certain circumstances, also is not recog-
nized by the Supreme Court.3 5
Even if the circuits ever agree that climbing onto the
wing of an airplane constitutes a trespass, officers still
have other options available when they wish to observe
the interior of an airplane. For example, they can climb
onto other objects, including other airplanes, ladders, and
any nearby items that will allow them to see inside.3 1 6
Therefore, should the Supreme Court ever settle the issue
of whether an officer may climb onto a wing for the pur-
poses of the plain view doctrine, officers will still be able
to use the doctrine to look into airplanes, but will have a
clearer idea of what constitutes a trespass.
3, See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-84 (1984).
312 Id.; see also Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 464-73.
313 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
311 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967).
315 See supra notes 293-295 and accompanying text.
314 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (holding that aerial
observations are not trespasses); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (al-
lowing officers to assume contorted positions to view objects).
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F. Other Exceptions
1. Limited Intrusions ("Stop and Frisk")
The Supreme Court has recognized a limited right to
stop, briefly detain, and search a person for investigatory
purposes based solely on reasonable suspicion, which is a
level of suspicion that is less than probable cause. 1 7 The
reasonable suspicion standard requires that the officer's
observations lead him to reasonably "conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot. . .. ,318
A court will employ a totality of the circumstances test to
determine if the officer's conclusions were reasonable.3 19
The scope of such a search is limited to a pat down of the
person's outer clothing, ostensibly to determine if he is
carrying a weapon. 2
The Fifth Circuit has applied this exception to the "lim-
ited detention" of an airplane and its pilot. In United States
v. Worthington,3 2 1  a pilot under surveillance made a
number of quick flights throughout Texas during a
twenty-four hour period, unloading empty boxes during
one stop. 32 2 When the airplane made a final stop because
.117 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The Court did not define "reasonable
suspicion," but instead gave the following guidelines:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his expe-
rience that criminal activity may be afoot and that persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where
in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and weapons seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom
they were taken.
Id. at 30-31.
-m Id. at 30.
3,- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
3o Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
32, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977).
322 Id. at 1278.
of poor weather conditions, customs agents blocked the
airplane's path so that it could not depart and advanced
toward the airplane with their guns drawn. Looking into
the airplane from the ground, one agent observed burlap
bags, which he correctly believed to be filled with mari-
juana. The agent then told the pilot to raise his hands and
remain seated.323
The court held that the pilot's erratic flying throughout
the day gave rise to reasonable suspicion to stop and de-
tain, 24 and that the burlap bags in plain view from the
ground gave rise to probable cause to arrest the pilot.325
The court justified the subsequent search of the airplane
based on both the automobile exception and the plain
view doctrine.326
The initial detention of the pilot and airplane, however,
may well have been beyond the scope of the limited de-
tention allowed by the "stop and frisk" exception.3 2 7 The
agents blocked the path of the airplane, approached the
pilot with at least one gun drawn, and ordered him to re-
main seated with his hands raised.328 The dissenting
judge argued that the initial blocking of the airplane and
the agents' subsequent approach with guns drawn consti-
tuted an arrest, or was at least more than the limited de-
tention allowed by the exception. 9 If the dissenting
judge is correct, the pilot was arrested before probable
cause arose, as both the majority and dissent agreed that
probable cause arose when the agent first saw the burlap
bags in the airplane.3 3 0 Therefore, under a United States v.
Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis,3 3 ' the ini-
tial detention was illegal, thus, the "fruits" of that deten-
323Id.
324 Id. at 1279.
3 25 Id. at 1280.
326 Id.
-.27 Id. at 1282 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
3' Id. at 1278, 1282.
329 Id. at 1282.
See id. at 1278, 1282.
"' See supra note 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.
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tion would be inadmissible as evidence." 2 It is important
to note, however, that the airplane might not have been
able to take off despite the detainment because of bad
weather. Therefore, the use of the evidence might have
been upheld under the inevitable discovery doctrine. 3
2. Administrative Inventory Searches
Once a vehicle is properly impounded for any reason,
for example being towed for a parking violation, authori-
ties may perform an administrative inventory search. 4
This search may be performed even if independent prob-
able cause to search does not exist.33 5 The justification
for this search is threefold: (1) the need to protect the
property of the vehicle's owner, (2) the need to inventory
the items inside the vehicle to protect the authorities from
subsequent claims made by the owner, and (3) the need to
protect the police and others from potential dangers, such
as a bomb planted inside the vehicle.336
Administrative inventory searches may also be per-
formed incident to arrest for the same reasons. 7 In
United States v. Walden,338 an airplane search was justified
as both an administrative inventory search and as a search
incident to arrest.33 9 Officials impounded the airplane be-
cause of the pilot's evasive conduct, his failure to produce
ownership and registration documents, and because regis-
tration numbers were taped rather than painted on the
airplane's tail. The court held these factors sufficient to
justify the airplane's impoundment and subsequent ad-
ministrative search. The pilot's conduct immediately after
the impoundment led to his arrest, which justified a
332 Id.
333 See supra note 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inevitable
discovery doctrine.
-- 4 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976).
33. Id.
.- d. at 369.
337 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).
s 707 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1983).
31 Id. at 131.
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search of the airplane incident to arrest.3 4 °
3. Open Fields Doctrine
Pursuant to the open fields doctrine, an officer may
trespass on private property as long as the trespass is on
an "open field" and not on the curtilage, which is the area
immediately surrounding a dwelling.3 41 In Patterson v. Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board,342 the Tenth Circuit ap-
plied this doctrine to a non-drug-related search of the
exterior of an airplane parked outside a hangar. An FAA
safety inspector observed that Patterson had made
changes to his aircraft without obtaining the proper FAA
permits. The inspector reported the illegal modifications
to the FAA, which suspended Patterson's license. The
court justified the search of the aircraft on the basis of the
open fields doctrine because the airplane was not inside a
hangar when it was searched.343
4. Consent Searches
Officers do not need probable cause to search if they
obtain proper consent.3 " In order to give valid consent
to search any premises owned, occupied, or controlled by
another, a person must have a concurrent right to use the
property. 45 In addition, a person must give his consent
freely and voluntarily.3 46 The issue of consent arose in
United States v. Tussell,347 in which the court held that a pi-
lot who was leasing an airplane had the authority to con-
sent to a search because he had control of the airplane
concurrent with that of the owner.348
340 Id.
341 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-84 (1984).
342 638 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1980).
-143 Id. at 146.
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
315 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Stoner v. California, 376
U.S, 483, 489-90 (1964).
36 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.
347 441 F. Supp. 1092 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
349 Id. at 1103-04.
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5. Border Searches
Searches at international borders or their functional
equivalents comprise another exception to the warrant re-
quirement.34 0 Officers may stop and search vehicles at these
locations without a warrant, probable cause, or even rea-
sonable suspicion. 50 Officers may stop a vehicle at perma-
nent checkpoints beyond the border for any reason or no
reason at all, but searches must be based on probable
cause, which may arise after the vehicle has been
stopped.3 5 ' No special exceptions apply to roving border
patrols beyond the border or its functional equivalent.3 52
Like other government officials, they may stop vehicles for
questioning and brief detention based on reasonable sus-
picion. To search, however, they must have either a
search warrant or probable cause to search, or the circum-
stances must qualify as one of the recognized fourth
amendment exceptions allowing a search. 54
The general rule concerning airplanes is that an officer
must demonstrate with reasonable certainty that an air-
plane in fact crossed an international border. 5 The
mere opportunity to cross the border does not give rise to
the border exception.3 56 The test requires officers to
show more than probable cause to believe that a border
crossing occurred, but less than proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.3 5 7 Therefore, if an officer can demonstrate
with reasonable certainty that an aircraft crossed an inter-
national border, he may search the aircraft without even
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search. Of-
ficers may conduct these searches either near the border
or at its functional equivalents. International airports are
-49 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-75 (1973).
350 See id.
.'- United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976).
352 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
' Id. at 881-82.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555-56; Almeida-Sanchez , 413 U.S. at 269.
155 United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1113, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985).
3 56 Id. at 1124.
37 Id. at 1123.
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functional equivalents of the border and the same rules
apply. 358
V. CONCLUSION
A. The Supreme Court's Bright Line Rules
Although attempting to establish a set of clearly defined
bright line rules to aid officers in performing searches
without warrants, the Supreme Court has instead created
a tangled web of rules and exceptions that lower courts
cannot easily apply. Rules with strong logical foundations
have been replaced by bright line rules that often appear
arbitrary.35 9
For example, Chimel v. California 360 defined the scope of
a search incident to arrest as the area that is within the
reach or control of the arrestee.3 6 ' The justification for
this rule was-to protect the arresting officer from possible
harm and to prevent destruction of evidence.362 The
Supreme Court, however, extended the scope by allowing
officers to search the entire passenger compartment, in-
cluding the glove compartment and containers inside the
car. 363 This bright line rule gives officers clearly defined
parameters for an automobile search, but gives no gui-
dance regarding searches of boats, mobile homes, vans,
or airplanes. Does Chimel control these searches and limit
their scope to the area within the control of the arrestees,
or must the Court create separate bright line rules for all
types of vehicles?
The automobile exception provides another example of
358 Id.
359 See Alschuler, supra note 30, at 231. But cf Whitebread & Heilman, The
Supreme Court Escalates Its Counterrevolution in Criminal Procedure, 14 SEARCH &
SEIZURE L. REP. 153, 156 (1987) (criticizing the Burger Court for not adopting
clearly defined rules).
3- 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
36, Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63; see supra note 253 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Chimel rule.
362 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
363 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981); see supra notes 141 and
254-255 and accompanying text.
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the failure of the Court's bright line rules to clarify the
permissible scope of searches of other vehicles. 3 4 The
automobile exception allows a warrantless search of the
entire automobile, including the trunk and containers. 65
Should these parameters apply to an airplane that de-
pends upon its structural integrity to ensure safe flight? If
officers are allowed to tamper with or dismantle certain
parts of an airplane during their search, safety in subse-
quent flights could be compromised.
Another trend appearing in the Supreme Court's recent
fourth amendment decisions is that the Court appears to
be announcing its bright line rules in an attempt to up-
hold warrantless searches that involve narcotics. 66 In up-
holding a warrantless inventory search which uncovered
cocaine and methaqualone, ChiefJustice Rehnquist twice
suggested in Colorado v. Bertine367 that the warrant clause
applies only to searches conducted for the sole purpose of
criminal investigations.
B. The Circuit Courts' Difficulties in Applying the Rules
Until the Supreme Court chooses to address the appli-
cation of fourth amendment rules and exceptions to air-
craft searches, the following is a brief summary of the
state of the law as addressed by the appellate courts.
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly applied ex-
ceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement to
searches and seizures of aircraft, the majority of the courts
of appeals have attempted to do so. Some areas appear to
be fairly clear and settled, such as consent searches. 68
Other areas, including the application of the automobile
exception,3 69 the plain view doctrine, 370 and searches inci-
.- See supra notes 133-249 for a discussion of the automobile exception.
36 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
366 See Galloway, Emergence of a Two-Track Fourth Amendment Model, 15 SEARCH &
SEIZURE L. REP. 33, 38-39 (1988).
367 479 U.S. 367, 371-72, 375 (1987).
368 See supra notes 344-348 and accompanying text.
3'' See supra notes 133-249 and accompanying text.
.70 See supra notes 284-316 and accompanying text.
COMMENTS
dent to arrest 37' are neither clear nor settled.
For example, the courts do not agree on whether the
automobile exception applies to airplanes. Four circuits
apply the exception 372 and one refuses to expressly apply
it. 373 Not only are the courts undecided as to whether the
exception applies, they are also undecided on the appro-
priate rationale for applying the exception. Most courts
focus on an airplane's mobility, because they have decided
that mobility makes an airplane comparable to an automo-
bile. 74 Even if an airplane is comparable to an automo-
bile, the mobility rationale may not be appropriate for
airplanes that are parked or otherwise secured.3 75 Other
courts focus on the reduced expectations of privacy a per-
son has inside both airplanes and automobiles in holding
that the exception is applicable to airplanes. 6 The
courts, however, have not explained why a person has a
reduced expectation of privacy inside an airplane. Logical
arguments would include the facts that airplanes are regu-
lated heavily by the government, and that hangars and
other parking areas in small airports are usually accessible
to the public. Airplanes, however, are more difficult to
see into than automobiles because of their height, which
should increase expectations of privacy. 377 While many
courts recognize some type of "airplane exception" based
on the automobile exception, their applications of the ex-
ception are not consistent. 7 8
The circuit courts also have not determined which areas
of an airplane may be searched pursuant to a lawful
171 See supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 169-225 and accompanying text for the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits' application of the automobile exception to aircraft.
31. See supra notes 226-231 and accompanying text for the Fifth Circuit's refusal
to expressly extend the automobile exception to aircraft.
34 See supra notes 169-203 and accompanying text.
.17 See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 246-247 and accompanying text.
377 Id.
-478 See supra notes 232-249 and accompanying text.
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arrest.3 79 If an airplane is the functional equivalent of an
automobile, then the entire passenger compartment may
be searched. 80 Courts, however, have not defined what
comprises an airplane's passenger compartment. There-
fore, it is not clear whether interior baggage compart-
ments may be searched, or whether a search is limited to
the area within the wingspan or control of the arrestee. A
further problem is that the circuit courts occasionally con-
fuse searches incident to arrest with automobile exception
searches .38
A third area in which the courts have not set clear pa-
rameters is the plain view doctrine. The courts seem to
apply this exception when they are not certain which rule
should apply but want to hold the search was legal. One
disagreement among the circuits is whether climbing onto
an airplane's wing is acceptable under this exception. 82
The Tenth Circuit allows climbing onto a wing when exi-
gent circumstances exist, but exigency is not a recognized
consideration under the plain view doctrine. 83 The Fifth
Circuit holds that climbing onto a wing is a trespass under
most circumstances. 4 Therefore, the trespassing officer
does not satisfy the doctrine's requirement that he have a
legitimate reason for being where he is.3 85 Finally, the
courts have applied the "stop and frisk" exception and
the open fields doctrine when other exceptions might
have been better applied. 86
371) See supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text for a discussion of searches
incident to arrest.
380 See supra notes 253-255 and 276-282 and accompanying text.
38, See supra notes 272-276 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Elev-
enth Circuit's confusion of the two different searches.
382 See supra notes 286-316 and accompanying text.
38- See supra notes 303-309 and accompanying text.
-34 See supra note 299 and accompanying text for the Fifth Circuit's holding.
385 See supra notes 284-289 and accompanying text.
386 See supra notes 317-333 and accompanying text for a discussion of "stop and




A possible solution to the problems in applying fourth
amendment principles to airplanes might be to create a
separate set of bright line rules for airplanes. The result
would be an "airplane exception" that would allow a war-
rantless search, based on probable cause, of any area of
the airplane that would not compromise the structural in-
tegrity of the aircraft. This solution, however, would sim-
ply add to the already confusing matrix of bright line rules
that governs searches and seizures.3 8 7
To both ensure the protection of fourth amendment
rights and provide a clear set of rules for officers to follow
in conducting warrantless searches, the Court should
avoid creating unrelated bright line rules and return to a
"reasonableness" standard similar to the one announced
in Chimel, which allows an officer to search the area within
the control of the arrestee.3 88 This standard allows an of-
ficer discretion in evaluating the circumstances facing him
and avoids bright line rules that may not apply to every
situation he faces. Finally, the Court should return to em-
phasizing the need to obtain warrants whenever possible.
If an officer obtains a warrant in good faith, he avoids the
myriad of problems associated with justifying a warrant-
387 See Alschuler, supra note 30, at 285-86. Professor Alschuler describes a fic-
tional muscular, green graduate of the police academy of 1990, Officer Gazenga.
Gazenga is a good officer. He has memorized all 437 Supreme
Court bright line rules for search and seizure. For example,
Gazenga has made a lawful arrest in a car. Gazenga rip that car
apart! But Gazenga never touch trunk of car unless there is prob-
able cause, for Gazenga has read footnote 4 of Belton opinion.
Gazenga now has made a lawful arrest in a house. Different bright
line rule apply to a house. Gazenga may search glove compartment
of car when suspect far away, but may not search desk drawer in
living room unless suspect right there. Why? Supreme Court say
so. Gazenga just a cop.
Gazenga now has made lawful arrest in cabin cruiser. Oh no!
Supreme Court forgot to give Gazenga bright line rule for cabin
cruiser! What is poor Gazenga to do?
Id. at 286.
388 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); see supra notes 261-283
and accompanying text for further discussion of the scope of searches incident to
arrest.
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less search. 89
In light of the above differences among the circuits, it is
difficult to determine which rules and exceptions apply to
warrantless searches of airplanes under different circum-
stances. Clearly, one must have some type of property in-
terest in the airplane to have standing to contest a
warrantless search. ° One also must have an interest con-
current with that of the owner to have authorization to
consent to a warrantless search. 9' Other questions, such
as what parts of an airplane may be searched incident to
arrest, whether an officer may climb onto a wing to look
inside an airplane, and whether the automobile exception
applies to airplanes, are not settled. 92 Until the Supreme
Court addresses these issues, officers conducting airplane
searches should be aware of the problems that may arise
with warrantless searches. In addition, criminal defense
attorneys should be aware of how the different circuits
have applied traditional fourth amendment exceptions to
aircraft.
1"8' See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (holding that evidence is
admissible if it was obtained by an officer who acted in reasonable reliance on a
search warrant that was later found to be invalid; this is commonly known as the
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule).
,11' See supra notes 65-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of standing.
."' See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
392 See supra notes 133-249 and accompanying text for a discussion of the auto-
mobile exception as applied to airplanes; supra notes 250-283 and accompanying
text for a discussion of searches of airplanes incident to arrest; supra notes 284-
316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain view doctrine as applied
to airplanes.
